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In 2018 the Davis Tax Committee was tasked with the responsibility of investigating the 
feasibility of introducing an annual wealth tax in South Africa. This wealth tax would serve as a 
replacement for the existing wealth taxes that are Estate Duty, Donations Tax, Security 
Transfer Tax and Transfer Duty. There has since been great debate around this topic and the 
aim of this dissertation is to collate all the literature that has been researched on the wealth tax 
both nationally and internationally to conclude as to whether or not a wealth tax will be suitable 
for South Africa currently  
The two main reasons behind the proposal of a wealth tax are firstly, to increase tax 
contributions to the South African revenue. Secondly, it is as a measure of redress given that 
South Africa has great disparities in wealth with the wealth Gini coefficient currently reported to 
be 0.9.  
The wealth tax has not only been a contentious topic in South Africa, but has been debated 
globally. The OECD reported that initially 12 countries had implemented an annual wealth tax 
and now only 4 still have the tax operating in their economies. This dissertation focuses on 
lessons that can be learnt from international countries by conducting a country review on 
France, Germany and India. India is the only other BRICS country that had previously 
implemented the annual wealth tax and has since abolished it in 2015.  
Furthermore, it is important for the introduction of any tax in an economy to align with the 
principles of a good tax system. Adam Smith set out the canons of a good tax system such as 
simplicity, efficiency and equity and this dissertation assesses whether the wealth tax aligns 
with these ideals and investigates whether it would be fair to implement this tax as per the 
principles of vertical and horizontal equity. As mentioned above, South Africa already has 
existing wealth taxes. This study therefore interrogates whether the annual wealth tax is 
necessary since there are already wealth taxes that exist and whether these existing taxes on 
wealth meet the intended ideals of the wealth tax.   
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with the implementation of this tax. It 
was therefore important for this dissertation to juxtapose these. The dissertation concludes that 
the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of implementing a wealth tax in South Africa at 
the moment.  
The introduction of a wealth tax would therefore not be feasible in South Africa at the moment.  
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Definition of key terms 
• Wealth 
Wealth refers to all forms of accumulated marketable assets held and owned by 
individuals or households through savings or the preservation of inherited wealth 
(Trotman-Dickenson,1996). Net wealth (which is synonymously termed as wealth in this 
dissertation) is the difference between gross wealth and total debt.  
• Annual Wealth tax (‘wealth tax’ or ‘net wealth tax’) 
A wealth tax is a tax that is imposed on all the net wealth of the taxpayer. This tax may 
be imposed annually and is not dependent on the flow of cash, transfer of ownership or 
an economic transaction (Sanford et al.,1975:5) 
• Estate Duty 
Estate Duty is the tax that is payable by the estate of a deceased person on all the 
assets owned by the deceased on the day of death (Section 2 and 3 of the Estate Duty 
Act (45/1995), hereinafter referred to as the Estate Duty Act).  
• Security Transfer Tax 
Securities Transfer Tax is a tax that is levied on the transfer of a security. A security is 
any: 
o Share or depository in a company; or 
o Members interest in a close corporation (CC). 
• Transfer Duty 
Transfer Duty is a tax levied on the value of any property acquired by any person by 
way of a transaction or in any other way. Property for Transfer Duty purposes is any: 
o Land and fixtures 
o Real rights in land and minerals 
o Share of interest in a residential property 
o Share in a share-block company 
 
• Donations Tax 
Donations Tax is a tax payable by the donor on the gratuitous transfer of certain assets 
(Section 54-55 of the Income Tax Act). 
• Horizontal equity 
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Horizontal equity is a tax theory that states that people with the same ability to pay 
taxes should be taxed at more or less the same rates. 
• Vertical equity 
Vertical equity is a tax theory that states that large income earners should bear a 
greater burden of tax.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In as early as 1992, Gordon Young published a book called ‘The Price for Apartheid: The 
wealth tax and how it can pay for the re-construction of black communities1’ where he points 
out that Apartheid is the starting point for the predicament of inequality in South Africa. Prior to 
1994 some South Africans found themselves being favoured to acquire wealth based on the 
colour of their skin. The State, the law and institutions of every kind were favourable to white 
South Africans and enabled them to create an environment that was favourable for the 
creation of wealth by themselves and for themselves. Black South Africans, however, were 
excluded from this narrative and were only privy to opportunities to serve in a menial capacity. 
This is what conceived the ongoing disparity in wealth amongst South Africans and has 
continued to re-invent itself throughout the generations. Where the initial cause of the unequal 
distribution in wealth was colour, we now see the same thing happening through class and 
gender within all the racial groups.  
The question Young said that South Africans were then faced with was whether the holders of 
this wealth can imagine the transfer of political power not being accompanied by a further re-
distribution in wealth through a wealth tax? This question is still relevant today, over 26 years 
after that political power transferred. A further question is, will the ANC government satisfy the 
demand for re-distribution without ‘killing the goose that lays the golden eggs’? This was a key 
point in the Davis Tax Committee (“DTC”) submissions - that a new wealth tax could inhibit 
investment and was unlikely to generate much revenue. This is a great concern as was also 
supported by Orthofer (2015) when she said that ‘given that the wealth-income ratio is so 
much lower in South Africa than it is in richer countries, capital related taxes not only have a 
much lower revenue potential than elsewhere, but might also undermine the country’s 
simultaneous efforts of encouraging capital formation and lowering the dependency on foreign 
capital inflows’.  
Various initiatives have been introduced to solve this conundrum, such as the programmes 
that are aimed at “uplifting” poor communities, social grants etc inequality has barely changed.  
A more recent suggestion for solving this issue is the introduction of an additional net wealth 
tax in South Africa.  
                                                      
1 Young, Gordon. The Price for Apartheid : the Wealth Tax and How It Can Pay for the Re-Construction of Black Communities . Salt River 
(South Africa): Labour Research Service, 1992. 
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In 2016 the then Minister of Finance, Mr Pravin Gordhan, tasked the DTC with looking into the 
feasibility of introducing a wealth tax in South Africa. The DTC then released a report in March 
2018 setting out its findings. An interesting point to note is that the DTC also looked into the 
performance of other forms taxes on wealth in South Africa in order to assess the need to 
introduce a new, additional or alternative, form of wealth taxation into the system. The taxes on 
wealth that already exist in South Africa are Estate Duty, Donations Tax, Transfer Duty and 
Security Transfer Tax.  
The DTC report looked specifically at Donations Tax and Estate Duty and found that the 
contributions of these taxes to overall National Revenue had decreased and amounted to 
0.17% of all the revenue collected. The DTC had also previously issued two reports on Estate 
Duty that showed that this tax had been underperforming and this further led to the Committee 
interrogating new ways of increasing its performance. The DTC further suggested that the 
system for attempting to increase the effectiveness of these taxes needed to be improved. The 
sentiment behind targeting Estate Duty and Donations Tax specifically was that since they 
were already taxes on wealth that were functioning in the South African economy, it should not 
be necessary to implement new forms of wealth tax while still achieving the objective of 
bridging the inequality gap. Improvements have since been made to these taxes as well as the 
taxation of trusts, but the impact of these changes is not yet clear. 
“When measuring inequality, we are not just concerned with the consumption of the rich-
important though this may be-but also with the power that wealth can convey. This power may 
be exercised over one’s family, as with the passing on of wealth to heirs, or more generally in 
such ways as control of the media or influence with political parties” (Anthony Atkinson, 
2015:37).  
These words remain true. While many may be reluctant to admit it, wealth does allow one a 
certain amount of power or influence as well as access to resources.  The Mail and Guardian 
released an article on 19 November 2019 titled, ‘Why South Africa is the most unequal 
society’2. It provides a summary of information provided by The Inequality Trends Report 
published by Stats SA and The South African Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. This article provided insights with regards to the 
statistics around the issue of inequality in South Africa.  
“Wealth is measured through the financial value of all the assets owned by an individual or a 
household. According to the Inequality Trends Report wealth inequality is considerably higher 
than income inequality. The wealth Gini coefficient was reported to be 0.94 in 2014/2015. 
                                                      
2 Webster, D (2019) ‘Why South Africa is the most unequal society’ 19 November 2019. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2019-11-19-why-
sa-is-the-worlds-most-unequal-society/ 19 December 2019 
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Moreover, the top 10% of the country earn between 56-58% of the income and simultaneously 
possess approximately 95% of the wealth in South Africa” (Inequality Trends Report, 2019:56).  
The article also shows that the ownership of financial capital is a key contributor in the 
widening gap of inequality in South Africa. Between 2003 and 2016 the economy grew by 4%, 
however, the income received by the top 5% of the population from assets like shares as well 
as capital gains grew by 20%. The top 1% obtains almost half of their income from shares and 
capital gains.  
Spatial inequality is also a reality in South Africa. This has persisted, even 25 years after South 
Africa became a democracy, owing to enduring colonial and apartheid geographies. This 
disadvantages some South Africans in terms of finding work, as was stated by the Socio-
Economic Rights Institute (SERI), thus restricting them access to opportunities to acquiring 
wealth (SERI report, 2016:10).  
The article provides statistics around how the peripheral homes of many black communities 
directly disadvantages them in terms of opportunities to find work. The Bantustan borders that 
were put in place by apartheid law still mark contours around access in the countryside and, 
according to the Inequality Trends Report there are still great pockets of deprivation that 
persist in South Africa’s former homelands, predominantly in rural Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu 
Natal. The only tangible form of improvement was an increase, by 41.8%, in access to 
sanitation in impoverished Limpopo homes ie: Venda, Lebowa and Gazankulu. The above 
statistics emphasise how inequality is a crisis in South Africa and further validates the 
government’s attempts at seeking solutions to this issue (Mail and Guardian,2019).  
It is, however, important to clearly define what constitutes ‘wealth’ and who is considered to fall 
within the term ‘the wealthy’. An important point to note is the fact that a tax on wealth and a 
tax on the wealthy are different things (DTC report, 2018:8). This is because the income 
stream that is produced from wealth is taxed via the income tax system. Wealth, however, as 
stated by Atkinson in his statement above, allows a person access to certain benefits that 
exceed the rate of return that it generates and it is thus argued that wealth is a tax base in its 
own right (DTC report, 2018:8).  
“Wealth, as defined for tax purposes, refers to different forms of accumulated marketable 
assets by individuals or households through savings or the preservation of inherited wealth. 
Net wealth would therefore be the difference between gross wealth and total debt” (Trotman-
Dickenson, 1996). 
In an attempt to establish who qualifies as “the wealthy” and to emphasise the disparities that 
exist in global wealth distribution since the 1970’s, many wealth-to-income studies have been 
performed. Amongst other things these studies have shown that the ratio of private wealth to 
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national income have almost doubled (DTC, 2018:15). As stated earlier in this chapter, the top 
10% of South Africa’s population owns 95% of the country’s wealth and this, on its own, 
reinforces the theoretical argument that wealth distribution is often more unequal than income 
distribution. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper the top 10% will then be described as 
‘the wealthy’.  
The Davis Tax Committee issued a report on Tax Administration in 2017. This report contained 
a chapter on High Net Worth Individuals (“HNWI’s”) wherein it sets out how SARS defined who 
qualifies as a high net worth individual, for its purposes, as: Those individuals whose “income 
exceeds R7 million per annum or they have net assets worth more than R40 million. They 
represent 18% of the HNWI register. Of the 6 545 individuals in this segment, about 557 have 
only net assets that meet the criteria i.e. in excess of R40m, without income in excess of R7m, 
and around 5 824 qualify under the income criteria, but not the assets criteria. Therefore, 
around 164 people in this sub-segment meet both the income and net asset criteria i.e. income 
in excess of R7m and net assets in excess of R40m” (DTC report on TAA, 2017:41). The 
report goes on to further state that: “Less than 1% of the individuals (234) on the HNWI 
register can be classified as Ultra HNWIs. These individuals have net assets exceeding R75 
million. There is no income criteria for this sub-segment” (DTC report on TAA, 2017:41). 
1.2. Problem Statement 
There are clearly compelling arguments for taxing the wealthy in South Africa. However, there 
are still some valid arguments as to why a new or alternative wealth tax would not be feasible 
in the current South African landscape. One of these arguments is that it would erode the 
capital base in the economy. Professor Deborah Tickle published an article in the 
September/October 2019 (issue 78) offering of the Tax Talk Magazine, published by the SA 
Institute of Tax Practioners. In this article she brings to the fore very important arguments 
around why the annual wealth tax would not be feasible for the South African economy as it 
stands and bases her arguments on The DTC report as well as other literature that has been 
published on the matter. This dissertation will collate the arguments from the proponents and 
opponents of the annual wealth tax to come to an answer to the problem statement: 
Is the introduction of an annual wealth tax feasible in the current South African landscape?  
As mentioned above, South Africa already has taxes on wealth. The question can thus be 
expanded to become: 
Should an annual wealth tax be introduced in addition to the existing wealth taxes, or should 
they be abolished and an annual wealth tax be instated?  
As mentioned earlier on in this chapter the Finance Ministry tasked the DTC to look at the 
possibility of introducing an annual wealth tax in South Africa. The main reasons behind this 
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request was that all other attempts that have been made to bridge inequality have only done 
so on a small scale, if at all. The further questions, however, that arise, given the current 
economic climate in South Africa, are: will an annual wealth tax aid South Africans or leave 
South Africans worse off? Who will this tax affect? How and on what will the tax be levied? 
 
 
1.3. Research objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation is to do an in-depth analysis of the literature from the 
proponents and opponents of an annual wealth tax, particularly as the literature applies to 
South Africa. This dissertation will aim to balance these views. Further to this, it will aim to 
arrive at a conclusion regarding whether the proposed tax would be better suited for South 
Africa than the existing wealth taxes. This dissertation will by no means aim to provide a novel 
solution as that extends beyond the chosen scope.  
1.4. Limitations of Scope 
There are many methods and avenues that could be explored in order to achieve the objective 
of decreasing the inequalities in wealth in South Africa. Taxation is by no means the only 
viable method that can achieve it. However, the scope of this particular paper is limited to 
taxation. It is important to note that the arguments put forward in the paper do not promote 
taxation as the ‘silver bullet’ to the wealth and income disparities that exist in the South African 
economy. There are other aspects that can be considered, such as land reform, programs on 
the expenditure side of the fiscal budget and, perhaps, even making important alterations to 
national and global policies. 
This dissertation is not oblivious to the fact that tax as a stand-alone component of the national 
budget will not provide a complete solution to the wealth inequality issue in South Africa, but 
seeks to look at what impact the introduction of an annual wealth tax could potentially have. 
The main aim of this dissertation will be to objectively balance the views that are in favour of a 
tax of this nature and those that oppose it and to further explain the justifications for both 
views.  
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, there are wealth taxes that already exist in South 
Africa. Chapter five will provide information on these wealth taxes with the exception of 
Securities Transfer Tax. The dissertation does acknowledge this tax but will not provide an in-
depth analysis on it.  
1.5. Research Method 
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The research method will be a literature review. This will be conducted on secondary literature 
in order to obtain a theoretical point of view for the study and to establish a basic 
understanding of what an annual wealth tax would mean for South Africa. The research will 
review both local and international literature with regard to this topic. 
This will include review and comparison of a country which has considered an annual wealth 
tax and opted not to implement it, a country that has since abolished the tax and one that has  
implemented such a tax and retained it. These countries are Germany, India and France 
respectively.  
There were two main reasons behind the decision to analyse the abovementioned countries. 
Firstly, fundamentally analyse the history of these countries to establish the processes and 
difficulties these countries went through that resulted in the non-adoption or abolishment of 
their wealth tax.  Secondly to gain an understanding of what alternatives there are in the event 
of South Africa opting not to implement an annual wealth tax.    
The dissertation acknowledges that France and Germany are developed countries and 
therefore their economic context, compared to South Africa, may differ. However, the aim of 
the country review is to gather information around the successes and failures that these 
countries have experienced with regards to the implementation of an annual wealth tax and to 
provide South Africa with a with a blueprint to work on to guide the decision.  
1.6. Chapter Summary 
This, chapter (one) begins with introduction of the topic of a wealth tax and the rationale 
behind the proposal of introducing it in South Africa. The chapter provides insights into the 
status quo with regards to inequality and how wealth is currently distributed in the country. It 
furthermore sets out the research question and methodology. 
Chapter two will look at international literature about France, India and Germany which have 
successfully implemented a wealth tax, abolished the annual wealth tax and still considering to 
do so, respectively. This chapter will serve as a means to provide an international example of 
the challenges and the benefits of an annual wealth tax at these different stages.  
Chapter three will interrogate whether the introduction of an annual wealth tax aligns with the 
ideals of a good tax system. It will assess this proposal against the backdrop of some of the 
canons of a good tax system put forward by Adam Smith. These are simplicity, efficiency and 
equity. It will look further into the canon of equity mainly under the two basic tax principles of, 
firstly, ability to pay and, secondly, the benefit principle relative to horizontal and vertical equity.  
Chapter four will review literature that has been published by the proponents and the 
opponents of an annual wealth tax. This chapter will then juxtapose this literature and will 
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conclude on whether it would be advantageous or not to administer an annual wealth tax in 
South Africa.  
Chapter five will analyse statistics that have been published on the existing wealth taxes in 
South Africa. It will take an even closer look at Estate Duty, in particular, and analyse whether 
it would be in the best interests of the country to replace it with an annual wealth tax. 
Chapter six will then summarise and conclude. 
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Chapter Two: Lessons from international countries 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a report 
titled. “The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD”3 in which net wealth taxes and 
the design thereof are examined and analysed. The OECD provides good background to 
wealth taxes and how their role has transformed and developed in different OECD countries 
over time. This part of the dissertation is designed to look at how different countries have 
responded to the annual wealth tax and to highlight the challenges faced by these countries, 
as well as how an annual wealth tax may have benefited others. The OECD report states that 
in 1990 there were twelve OECD countries that had implemented an annual wealth tax but that 
this has reduced to, now, only four that still maintain the regime.  
Although there were a number, the most common two reasons provided, for why eight of the 
countries demolished their annual net wealth tax regime, were that it did not bring enough 
revenue income and that it had high administration costs..  
It is important to note that the debate around the annual wealth tax will differ from country to 
country. This is owing to the fact that each country has its unique context, particularly when it 
comes to socio-economic and political dynamics. Chapter one of this dissertation provided the 
particular context of South Africa in this regard and will thus not be repeated here. There are, 
however, lessons that can be learned by South Africa from other countries who have reached 
various stages in their implementation of the annual wealth tax, so as to determine if the 
annual wealth tax will be feasible for South Africa.  
Examples of these are the costs and extent of administration and enforceability needed for the 
annual wealth tax. These two issues arise especially when assets that are either highly mobile 
or easily hidden from tax authorities are removed from the base. Extensive monitoring will then 
be required. (DTC,2018:37). Another more prominent example is the question of whether the 
tax would yield sufficient revenue to support its costs. If not, then would the tax would be 
merely symbolic. (DTC, 2018:37).   
As indicated above, both the OECD and DTC reports highlight that the number of OECD 
countries that levy an annual wealth tax has decreased from twelve to four between 1990 and 
2017. Some of the countries that have repealed the annual wealth tax are Austria (1994), 
Denmark (1997), Germany (1997), the Netherlands (2001), Finland (2006), Iceland (2006), 
Luxemberg (2006), Sweden (2007) and Spain (2008). Once the financial crises had subsided 
Spain and Iceland decided to re-introduce their net wealth taxes as a temporary fiscal 
consolidation measure. According to the OECD report, at the time of its issue, in 2018, the only 
OECD countries that still maintain an annual wealth tax are France, Norway, Switzerland and 
                                                      
3 The role and design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No 26, OECD Publishing, Paris,2018 
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Spain. The OECD report of 2018 states that the annual wealth taxes in these countries raise 
very little revenue with the exception of Switzerland that managed to attribute 3.5% of its 
revenue to annual wealth taxes in 2015. The other three countries all reported less than 1% of 
their total tax revenue as being derived from net wealth taxes (OECD,2018:16).  
In CP Basson’s dissertation, titled “The implication of wealth transfer taxation in the absence of 
Estate Duty” he references an article by E Law (1994), titled “The Purpose of Wealth Taxes”. 
He states that, in the article, the author reviewed Western Australia State tax and discovered 
that, among the OECD countries, there was very little consensus on the purpose of wealth 
taxes. What he found to be most common was that countries that did levy a wealth tax did so 
in an effort to increase revenue. Other countries stated that their reasons were horizontal 
equity and taxing according to the ability to pay (CP Basson, 2015: 28).  
Politically induced exemptions on net wealth taxes have created a platform for tax avoidance, 
especially among the very wealthy, who can afford expert tax advice. “In a country with a 
narrow wealth tax base, wealth taxation can be meaningful only if the tax rate is high. A high 
tax rate, however, imposes a very large burden on taxpayers, and in particular, taxpayers 
without the means to exploit tax loopholes through seeking expensive tax advice as well as 
adequate cash flow if the tax is levied on assets that are not liquid” (Mbewe S and Woolard 
I,2016)4. In the South African context this would hold the potential of eroding the tax base.  
The purpose of this section of the dissertation is to observe what challenges and benefits of an 
annual wealth tax have been observed in Germany, India and France and to compares them to 
the South African context. The dissertation does acknowledge that two of the OECD countries 
mentioned in this section, France and Germany, are developed countries compared to South 
Africa. As a developing country, India is more likely to have an economy similar to South Africa 
with regards to inequality.  
However, this section is concerned with the challenges and benefits of an annual wealth tax in 
these countries regardless of how the socioeconomic and political statuses compare. The aim 
was, thus, to select a sample that reflects the complete spectrum of countries being from those 
that have abolished the tax to those that have successfully implemented the tax and one that is 
in the process of debating the tax.  
It is worth noting that India is the only BRICS country (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) that has implemented an annual wealth tax and subsequently abolished it (in 2015). It 
replaced it with a less complex additional 2% surcharge on specified income of the ‘super-rich’, 
                                                      
4 Mbewe S and Woolard I (2016) Cross-sectional features of wealth inequality in South Africa: Evidence from the National Income Dynamics 
Study. SALDRU Working Paper No. 185, South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town 
 
An Investigative Discussion on the Feasibility of an annual wealth tax in South Africa 
• • • 
17 
 
which  was considered more efficient and equitable, particularly as many of the wealthy were 
able to evade wealth taxation by obtaining expensive tax advice” (DTC, 2015:50).This 
dissertation will not explore the details behind why India is the only country to follow this route, 
however, it is worth noting as the BRICS countries share similar circumstances with South 
Africa with regards to inequality.  
2.1 India 
 
India agreed to the implementation of an annual wealth tax in 1956 at the instance of the 
Kaldor Committee (DTC, 2018:48). According to the Kaldor Commission ‘the main 
recommendation was to broaden the tax base through the introduction of a net wealth tax, a 
capital gains tax, an expenditure tax and a general gift tax’ (DTC,2018:48). It is worth pointing 
out that capital gains tax is not a wealth tax. It is an income tax on capital income (DTC, 
2016:20). This viewpoint was also supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
December 2000 in the review of the CGT proposals. Following the Kaldor Commission 
recommendations, the gift and net wealth tax were introduced as part of the Indian Wealth Tax 
Act of 1957 and the Gift Tax Act of 1958. However, these taxes did not yield a great amount of 
revenue for India. The wealth tax yielded R.10 cr from 1956 to 1966, the Gift Tax yielded 
R1.5cr and the Expenditure Tax R4.5cr5 
The Kaldor committee stated its reasons for its recommendations as: “firstly to reduce the 
possibility of tax evasion. Secondly, it was to properly account for an individual’s ability to pay. 
Lastly, it was to promote an egalitarian society through the use of redistributive measures that 
provide no disincentive effects both conceptually and operational” (DTC, 2018:49).  
The Indian Tax Reform Committee (“TRC”) recommended that the annual wealth tax should be 
restricted to wealth that was unproductive. The distinction between which assets would qualify 
as productive and unproductive wealth was set out in the 1992/1993 budget (Pandey, 2006).  
However, according to Pandey (2006), over time, there had been quite a few challenges with 
the administration of the net wealth tax in India. Firstly, there were certain inequities that where 
created by the problem of valuation of assets, as there were some assets that were exempt 
from taxation. “Secondly, tax authorities did not account for the indexation of wealth taxation 
with respect to inflation. Thirdly, the tax burden of the collective incidence of the net wealth tax, 
income and other forms of taxes (such as property tax) imposed a heavy burden on the 
taxpayers” (DTC,2018:49). 
                                                      
5 John Toye, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 183-200 
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In 2001 the Controller and Auditor General of India (“CAG”) took to investigate the net wealth 
tax in India with specific objectives (DTC, 2018:49). These objectives where the following.  
• “to examine the efficiency with which the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act 
were implemented”; 
• “to examine the quality standards of wealth tax assessments”; and 
• “to examine if there was tax leakage at any stage of the wealth tax assessment”. 
 
The report indicated that “the number of wealth assessees had decreased while the number of 
income assessees had increased — suggesting that certain taxpayers did not file their wealth 
tax returns, despite having taxable assets liable for wealth taxation” (DTC, 2018:49). The 
report further showed  
“the persistent case of lapses by tax assessing officers to establish a relationship and 
correlate income, as well as wealth tax records, to ensure there was no tax evasion, 
despite receiving directives from the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Hence, there was a 
fall in revenue during the period (1994 to 1995 and 1998 to 1999) from the annual 
wealth tax — suggesting that taxpayers were either not filing wealth tax returns or not 
disclosing the true value of their wealth and could have possibly even migrated or lost 
their wealth due to how incredibly extensive the taxes were” (DTC, 2018:49). 
The DTC indicated that although the Indian government was successful in enacting the Wealth 
Taxation Act in 1957, the “nominal revenue collected was inadequate to match the 
administrative burden on the tax authority and the compliance cost on the taxpayer”. The tax 
was levied on unproductive assets, luxury cars, jewelry etc, which are difficult to locate and 




The ‘Tax on Great Fortunes’ was the first form of net wealth tax in France and was introduced 
in 1982 (DTC, 2018:38). The net wealth tax was abolished between 1987 and 1989 and re-
introduced again later in 1989 as ‘the Solidarity Tax on Wealth’ (Impôt de Solidarité sur la 
Fortune, ISF) (DTC, 2018:38).  
According to the DTC report “France has a long history of annual wealth taxes and it was only 
during World War I that France introduced taxes on income” (DTC, 2018:38). “Indeed, from 
1791 to 1914 a property tax constituted the central tool of government finance”.  
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France also has other forms of taxes on wealth. These include a property tax and an estate 
tax. An interesting point to note is that the ISF contributions have continued to increase over 
the past two decades (DTC, 2018:40). 
A profound argument in the public debate about the ISF in France is an increasing concern 
that ISF has resulted in tax migration. The DTC report states that while there has been no 
successful way of quantifying the effect that the ISF has had on migration in France, given 
other tax changes that occurred at the same time as well as non-tax reasons for migration, 
there is evidence that suggests a link between the reintroduction of the ISF and increased 
migration (DTC,2018:40). 
Astarita (2015) plots data from the French national treasury drawing a distinction between 
gross and net outflows.  
Figure 1: The average wealth of taxpayers migrating from France 
Source: DTC report 2018 
Statistical evidence, provided in the DTC report, indicates that people moving abroad are 
generally wealthier than the average ISF taxpayer. The countries that the migrants emigrate to 
have been reported to included Switzerland and Belgium (DTC, 2018:41) 
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In 2011 there was a spike in the number of people who were reported to have emigrated from 
France.  
There have been estimates by the media that suggest that “one third of French billionaires 
either live in – or at least hold substantial residential or financial assets in - Switzerland and 
Belgium” (DTC, 2018:41). “Interestingly, almost no wealthy French citizens resided in Belgium 
prior to 1981”. This brings to the fore the question of whether different wealth taxation systems 
between countries influence how people choose their country of residence? And, if this is the 
case, can a country like South Africa, that is already struggling economically, afford to lose 
more wealthy people to more ‘tax friendly’ countries? It is submitted that South Africa cannot 
afford to lose wealthy citizens as there are government reform measures that depend on tax 
revenue from these individuals for funding. Initiatives such as the social grants for the elderly, 
disabled and children would suffer as this would empty the funding coffers. 
 
2.3  Germany 
 
“In a number of OECD countries, particularly Germany, both income and wealth 
inequality have been on the rise. From the late 1990s to 2005, Germany’s Gini 
coefficient rose substantially by four percentage points (Grabka & Groebel, 2013; 
OECD, 2014). The Gini coefficient for the asset index ranges from 0 to 1 and its 
interpretation is no different. As the coefficient approaches zero, the more equal the 
population gets; and as it shifts towards one, the more unequal the population gets. The 
Gini coefficient value of zero denotes perfect equality while the Gini coefficient value of 
one implies absolute inequality” (Inequality Trends Report,2019:49).  
The Household Finance and Consumption Survey of 2013 found that Germany has the most 
unequal distribution of personal wealth in Europe (DTC, 2018:41). At the same time, taxes 
have become less progressive due to increased international tax competition. What followed 
was a reduction in business and capital income taxes, as well as personal income taxes, while 
taxes on personal wealth have been discarded. Taxes on inheritance remain insignificant 
(DTC, 2018:41) 
Much like in South Africa there has recently been a contentious debate around the introduction 
of the taxation of capital income and wealth in Germany. Politically, higher taxes on the “rich” 
have been proposed and endorsed by left-wing parties (DTC, 2018:41). The discussion has 
included the reintroduction of a recurrent or annual net wealth tax, a once off capital levy 
aimed at reducing government debt, or decreasing tax privileges for company succession and 
other tax breaks by reinforcing inheritance taxes (Mbewe S and Woolard I,2016:177). 
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It has been reported that the contribution of property and wealth-related taxes to German taxes 
over the last decade has been minimal, compared to other countries in Europe (Mbewe S and 
Woolard I,2016:177). According to the IMF (2013) they “account for less than 1 per cent of 
GDP, with the largest contribution coming from taxes on real estate property, and in particular, 
from local property taxes and taxes on the transfer of individual property between states” 
(Mbewe S and Woolard I, 2016:177). 
The IMF (2013) reported that inheritance and gift tax is the only existing tax that focuses on 
taxing the “rich” or “wealthy strata of the population” though it contributes less than 0.2% of 
Germany’s GDP (Mbewe S and Woolard I, 2016:179).  
A justification for this is the argument that the main reason for the low revenue generation of 
wealth taxation in Germany over the last few decades was the outdated "standard values" of 
real estate properties. These properties are reported to not have been updated since the 
1960’s and are thus unattractive to place on the market to sell. “In 1997, the recurrent wealth 
tax system was suspended after the constitutional court ruled that the undervaluation of real 
estate and business property (relative to other assets) was unconstitutional” (Mbewe S and 
Woolard I, 2016:176). 
Since 1997, however, there has been great debate in German tax policy discussions around 
the re-introduction of wealth taxation. There have been various proposals that have emerged 
that either favour or oppose the introduction of this tax in Germany, much as is the current 
case in South Africa. In the case of Germany, however, there have been two profound 
proposals atthe forefront of the net wealth taxation debate.  
“The first proposal was endorsed by the parliamentary group of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
Party (2012). The party advocates for the introduction of a one-time capital levy which would 
be used to service the debt incurred during the global financial crisis” (Mbewe S and Woolard I, 
2016:177). Ideally, only individuals with a net wealth greater than 1 million euros would be 
subject to the once-off levy. Corporations would be exempt from this levy since shareholders 
are subject to personal income tax. Following historical practices, payment of this levy would 
be made in instalments over a period of 10 years, subject to a standard interest rate for public 
debt (Mbewe S and Woolard I,2016:178). 
The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany) 
and several governments of individual states, governed by Social Democrats, put forward a 
second proposal on personal wealth taxation. They submitted a draft bill proposing the re-
introduction of recurrent taxation (DTC, 2018:43). Both corporations and individuals (including 
shareholders of corporations) would be legally responsible for wealth taxation. The issue of 
double taxation would be resolved by exempting half of any taxable wealth of corporations, as 
well as each shareholder’s corporate shares (DTC, 2018:44). 
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According to the DTC report  
“an important aspect of the taxation of personal wealth entails determining which 
assets, such as financial, business, real estate and some household assets (less any 
liabilities), are taxable. In order to ascertain and appraise the tax base, reliance has 
been placed on improved valuation procedures for gift and inheritance taxes since 
2009. Although the aim of improved valuation procedures is to capture the market value 
closely for tax commitments, standardised appraisals are a complex process (especially 
for small firms and real estate properties). Some level of tax evasion will still be 
prevalent in respect of foreign-held assets as international cooperation among tax 
authorities is still inadequate” (DTC, 2018:44).  
Moreover, there are significant costs that are associated with constantly valuing assets and, it 
could be argued that, until realization or transfer of assets, wealth  is ‘fictitious’ based on the 
fact that the value of assets fluctuate and can reduce to a minimal figure or nil, due to 
economic conditions and unforeseen events,  at any time (Tickle, 2019) 
The DTC report states that Bach et al. (2014) have analysed the revenue and distributional 
impact of a net wealth tax for Germany. The data presented by Bach et al. indicates that, 
based on the fact that net wealth tends to be highly concentrated at the top end of the 
distribution, the data suggest that a personal wealth tax would raise significant revenue albeit 
that high personal allowances are granted; thereby limiting the number of persons to a reduced 
fraction of taxpayers (DTC, 2018:44). This, to a certain extent, undermines some of the canons 
that were introduced by Adam Smith in his book titled: The Wealth of Nations. This, however, 
will be explained in further detail in Chapter three of this dissertation.  
Tax experts also highlight that wealth tax administration and compliance has been rather a 
heavily contested issue not only in Germany, but in other countries as well (DTC, 2018:44) 
The paper published by Mbewe and Woolard in 2016 states that a significant downside of an 
annual net wealth tax lies in its potential nature to discourage capital accumulation, which 
tends to cause several behavioural responses by economic agents towards decisions made in 
relation to investment and location, financing, tax evasion, administration, legal form and other 
strategies associated with wealth tax avoidance (Mbewe and Woolard I, 2016:169-183)  
2.4 Conclusion of the lessons from other countries 
 
India based its decision to abolish wealth taxes on the fact that they were not efficient and did 
not produce a significant amount of tax revenue for the country. Moreover, the choice to focus 
on ‘unproductive’ assets such as jewellery and luxury goods proved very difficult to value for 
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the purpose of taxing wealth (Mbewe S and Woolard I,2016:180). Additional challenges arise 
when identifying the tax base.  
The risk that the wealth tax will be paid mainly by the ‘fairly wealthy’, whose key assets are 
residential property in their country of residence, increases because the wealthiest people tend 
to hold an intricate and diverse set of assets, often abroad or through intricate structures that 
remove their holdings, like trusts – thereby making it easier for them to avoid taxes. At the 
extreme, there is some evidence that tax migration may even occur. Given such difficulties, 
public support for wealth taxation has often been unfavourable (Mbewe S and Woolard I, 
2016:169-183). 
The French experience in this regard is particularly enlightening. As mentioned earlier on in 
this chapter, the ‘the solidarity tax on wealth’ (impôt de solidarité sur la fortune [ISF]) 
contributed one-tenth of overall tax revenue by 2014.In addition to the ISF, France also has a 
property tax and an estate tax (Mbewe S and Woolard I, 2016:176). 
The key take-aways from the public debate about the ISF in France are the concerns the 
effects of the ISF on tax migration. The evidence supporting this claim is, however, difficult to 
obtain due to the fact that there are various issues outside of the wealth tax that result in 
emigration and deriving those that do indeed result from the wealth tax alone is a near 
impossible task (DTC, 2018:39).  
However, what is well established is that the wealth of people moving abroad was generally 
greater than that of the average ISF taxpayer. This is profound, as it then shifts the tax burden 
onto the middle class and retirees as those would now be the so called ‘wealthy’ left in France. 
An important point to note is the fact that most of the tax migrants migrate to Belgium and 
Switzerland, due to relatively low weath taxes there. It can also be noted that the complexities 
surrounding tax administration, as well as enforceability, can result in part of the tax base 
either becoming highly mobile or easily hidden from tax authorities – an issue which requires 
careful policy consideration.  
It is estimated that 65 French billionaires (who make up a third of the wealthiest French 
citizens) now either live abroad or hold substantial residential or financial assets in Switzerland 
and Belgium. This has impacted France negatively as it has lost the tax revenue from these 
citizens as well as their investments in the country (DTC, 2018:51).  
In Germany, the introduction of wealth taxation has also been the subject of tax policy debate 
in recent years. A number of proposals have emerged, arguing for or against the introduction 
of wealth taxation. The two main proposals that have been given great attention are the 
introduction of a once-off capital levy and the second being the re-introduction of a recurrent 
wealth taxation. However, neither have been implemented so far and the debate rages on. 
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Chapter Three: The Principles Of A Good Tax System 
The design of a tax system should be grounded on a clear set of economic principles. The 
economic principles that are prioritized in each economy are all relative based on the particular 
economy. This statement was supported by Memon Najeeb6 when he stated that a system 
should adhere to the principles of a good tax system by order of priority and these priorities will 
differ based on the objectives of the tax system in question. Conventionally, what constitutes a 
‘good tax system’ is assessed against the blueprint that was set by Adam Smith in his book 
titled ‘The wealth of Nations’ where he speaks about the ‘canons of a good tax system’. In his 
book, Smith states that the core canons of a good tax system are simplicity, efficiency and 
equity.  
The aim of this section of the dissertation is to look at the proposal of an annual wealth tax in 
South Africa and assess whether this would align with the virtues of a good tax system. This 
chapter will, firstly, look at what constitutes a good tax system by expanding on the three core 
canons mentioned above. This section will provide a definition of each of simplicity, efficiency 
and equity in the tax context and will then apply them to the proposal of an annual wealth tax in 
South Africa. Secondly, this chapter will look further into the canon of equity by exploring the 
principles of horizontal and vertical equity, as these are important principles when assessing 
the ‘fairness’ of a good tax system. Lastly, the chapter will look at the wealth tax proposal 
against the ‘benefit’ and ‘ability to pay’ principles to further explore whether or not the proposal 
aligns with the ideals of a good tax system. The chapter will then conclude on whether the 
introduction of a wealth tax would add to or disturb the balance of a good tax system.  
“The motivation for annual wealth taxes lies in two factors: first, the desire to seek 
redress on non-income benefits associated with the accumulation of personal wealth. 
This idea of seeking redress is based on the welfarist criterion or utility-based approach. 
Briefly, this principle assumes that the welfare of an individual depends on the 
consumption of goods and services, as well as the amount of leisure time they 
‘consume’. This then means that government’s goal should be to select a tax structure 
that aims to maximize social welfare at large, bearing in mind that, although there is a 
need to raise revenue to finance public expenditure, individuals are also sensitive to 
changes in the tax system. The core argument of the welfarist criterion is based on the 
idea that achieving improved social welfare requires an improvement in the well-being 
of individuals” (DTC,2018:29). 
                                                      
6
 Memon, Najeeb. “Prioritizing Principles of a Good Tax System for Small Business in Informal Economies.” Australian Tax Forum 25.1 (2010): 
57–94. Web. 
 
An Investigative Discussion on the Feasibility of an annual wealth tax in South Africa 
• • • 
25 
 
The potential that an annual wealth tax possesses to generate additional revenue income is 
put forward by the DTC only as a second motivation (DTC, 2018:29). 
3.  The three canons of a good tax system 
 
3.1. Simplicity 
Smith defined simplicity by stating that ‘the amount that each individual pays should be 
certain and not arbitrary’7. Part of this cannon is the suggestion that compliance costs 
should remain low, which Smith deems to be a very important facet of simplicity 
(Memon, 2010:68). Smith also states that administration costs should also be kept low, 
which reinforces the statement that the operational costs of a tax system should be kept 
low (Memon, 2010:68). The Meade Report8 also reiterates the sentiments expressed by 
Smith, by stating that the principle of simplicity in a tax system promotes acceptability 
for the tax system in the eyes of taxpayers. A tax system needs to be acceptable to the 
public and one of the main reasons for its acceptability is the system’s simplicity and it 
should be simple in all facets (Memon, 2010:69).  
 
The OECD also concurs with this opinion by stating that the ‘the tax rule should be 
simple to understand, so that taxpayers can anticipate the tax consequences in 
advance of a transaction9.  
The American Institute of Certified Public accountants has added a further facet to the 
definition of simplicity which is ‘convenience of payment’. In its 2009 report it states that 
this principle refers to the fact that ‘a tax should be due at a time or in a manner that is 
most likely to be convenient for the taxpayer’10. 
“In general, taxes on wealth and wealth transfers are less convenient for taxpayers 
to pay in comparison to other forms of taxes. In certain cases, especially with annual 
taxes, servicing the tax liability requires the sale of an asset in order to achieve the 
required liquidity to make the tax payment. Selling assets, however, may not be easy 
when demand is low or the economy is in a recession. In this case, the taxpayer 
would have to sell assets in a depressed market just to finance a tax liability. This 
                                                      
7 Adam Smith, ‘An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the wealth of Nations’ ed. Kathryn Sutherland (1993) 451-454.  
8
 The Structure and reform of Direct Taxation, Report of a Committee chaired by J.E> meade, The Institute of fiscal Studies, 1978 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin), 7-22. 
9
 ‘The implementation of the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions: The 2003 Report’ 2003,12 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/19/20499630.pdf at 12 october 2009.  
10
 ‘Guiding principles of a good tax policy’ A framework for evaluating tax proposals, Tax policy statement, American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants at http://ftp.aicpa.org/public/download/members/div/tax/3-10.pdf at 24 March 2009,12.  
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presents an unintended loss to the taxpayer over and above the tax payment” 
(DTC,2018:36). 
 Moreover, the fact that wealth taxes are very comprehensive in their nature means that there 
will be high costs associated with their administration. Collection costs are high because the 
assets need to inspected and valuated (DTC report, 2018:36). More specifically, as Memon11 
suggests, while analysing a tax system for large informal economies, simplicity should be 
given the highest priority because the high compliance cost arising from complex tax codes is 
one of the major causes for the large size of the informal economy in developing countries 
(Memon, 2010:71).  
3.2. Efficiency 
‘The power to tax involves power to destroy’. These were the words of Justice John 
Marshall12 in 2009 when he was commenting on the importance of an efficient tax 
system (Memon,2010:73). Though the extent of the power may vary from one type of 
tax to another, it is widely admitted that all taxes reduce the economic wellbeing of the 
people who ultimately bear their burden. Sometimes, it is even said that a perversely 
distorted system does more damage to all the citizens’ economic wellbeing than any 
foreign enemy ever could. Applying this to the context of an efficient tax system it is said 
that ‘a tax interferes with choice and thus causes a loss in utility by pushing the choice 
patterns of consumers and producers away from the ideal’13.  
 
All taxes thus have the potential to distort the choices of the three main players in an 
economy, namely: the consumers, producers and workers. This distortion takes place in 
the form of substitutive effects and leads to a misallocation of resources. To explain the 
substitution effect in an example is if a consumer would utilize one product in preference 
to another while the worker may have to seek different employment. However, the full 
extent of the substitutive effect depends upon how one actor (more likely to be the 
investor) shifts that tax burden to another actor (usually the consumer) and the impact 
this has on overall economy and the people in it. This brings about another issue which 
is tax-shifting which will be explained later in this chapter.  
 
                                                      
11
 Memon Najeeb, (2010) 'Prioritizing Principles of a Good Tax System for Small Businesses in Informal Economies' 25:1 Australian Tax 
Forum, Taxation Institute of Australia, 88. 
12
 David E. Wildasin, ‘Tax Reform in Kentucky: Principles and Practice ‘Chapter 1 In Financing State and Local Government: Future 
Challenges and opportunities, Kentucky Long Term Policy Research Centre, November 2001, 1 
http://www.kltprc.net/books/financinggov/Chpt_1.htm> at 12 June 2009. 
13
 Keith Bain ‘The Principles of Taxation-Part I’Notes on Public Finance, University of East London, Department of Economics, 2000 
http://homepages.uel.ac.uk/K.Bain/tax1.pdf at 6 January 2009.  
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An annual wealth tax can be classified as either additive or substitutive, depending on 
how the government requires taxpayers to meet the tax liability. An additive annual 
wealth tax is a tax paid only when an asset of market value is sold or disposed of due to 
e.g. death, whereas a substitutive tax is a fixed tax payment from either capital or 
annual income earned by owning an asset (Memon, 2010:75) 
To obtain the effective distribution of the tax burden, it is necessary to identify as 
accurately as possible the people who will end up bearing the burden of the tax in 
question and the extent of their share of that burden. In general, taxes are imposed on 
economic transactions along the production and distribution chain. Tax shifting reflects 
the fact that the imposition of a tax at a particular point on this chain may end up 
affecting the economic welfare of people at different points. The possibility of shifting the 
tax burden stems from the fact that socioeconomic agents can change their behavior in 
response to a tax, subject to the prevailing institutional arrangements. In a market 
economy, the burden of taxation is channeled mainly through changes in the prices of 
traded goods and services. Thus, people bear the burden of a tax when the imposition 
of the tax induces a change in the relative prices of the goods and services they buy 
and sell. In addition, a tax may affect the prices of untaxed goods and services that are 
substitutes or complements of the taxed ones. Such price changes are interpreted as 
“implicit” taxation14. 
Boadway et al stated in 2010 that, unlike other forms of taxation (such as income and 
consumption taxes), there still is very little theoretical guidance around the design of 
wealth tax policies around the world. This assists in explaining why there remains very 
little consensus globally on the best way of approaching the topic of an annual wealth 
tax.  
The requirements of developed and developing countries differ, hence the ranking of 
these principles to cater for requirements of large informal economies should be taken 
into account while assessing a tax system (Memon, 2010:76).  
Boadway et al. (2010) offer a comprehensive discussion on the taxation of wealth. They 
outline that the three main constraints associated with the process of designing a tax 
system include efficiency, administrative costs and political constraints. Firstly, 
achieving tax efficiency becomes difficult when the extent to which the introduction of an 
annual wealth tax not only creates distortions on people’s willingness to work but also 
distorts the decisions associated with wealth accumulation and disposal. Secondly, as 
                                                      
14
 The World BankPoverty Reduction and Economic Management Network Poverty Reduction GroupApril 2008  
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opposed to taxes on wealth transfer, the administrative costs involved in administering a 
net wealth tax can be substantial, especially as some forms of wealth are hard to 
measure and/or easy to conceal. A failure to tax some forms of wealth results in 
inequitable tax treatment. “Thirdly, tax reform or implementation inevitably produces 
winners and losers. The introduction or abolition of a new tax provides opportunities for 
some individuals to exploit the changes in the tax regime” (Memon, 2010:77).  
 
3.3. Equity 
The term equity speaks to the even-handed treatment of taxpayers in a tax system and 
conventionally has two facets. The first is known as horizontal equity, which says that 
taxpayers under similar economic circumstances should be taxed similarly15. The 
second is called vertical equity, which postulates that those taxpayers, who have better 
economic circumstances (i.e. higher ability to pay), should contribute more 
than others to the revenue. 
 
3.3.1. Horizontal equity 
“Horizontal equity is a synonym for fairness of a tax system16. In any fair tax 
system, people with the same ability to pay taxes should be taxed at more or less 
the same rates. Income is often used as a way to measure a person’s ability to 
pay. Income by itself is however not the only item that determines a person’s 
ability to pay. A person with a large asset base has additional benefits that arise 
from the ownership of these assets, over and above the normal income derived 
from the assets. These assets can serve as security and provide the holder with 
independence and peace of mind simply for owning these assets” (Sandford et 
al., 1975:5).  
This is an important fact in the discussion of the feasibility of a wealth tax as it 
commands attention to be drawn to the fact that wealth provides certain advantages 
and these advantages hold economic value and should be taxed. 
Horizontal equity is also important in a tax system for a number of reasons. The first 
of these being that it promotes a perception of fairness about the system and 
                                                      
15
 ‘Reform of the Australian Tax system’ Draft White Paper Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra, 1985, 14. 
16 Memon, N., 2012. Looking for suitable presumptive income tax design for large informal economies in terms of principles of a good tax 
system. Austl. Tax F., 27, p.907. 
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assists in the upliftment of the tax morale. This equitable treatment in a tax system 
is synonymous with fairness of the tax system and is considered to be a 
cornerstone for encouraging voluntary compliance amongst taxpayers. This is an 
important concept that aligns itself with the values of the OECD which states that 
“the potential for evasion should be minimized”17.  
 
An equitable tax system is particularly important in the tax system of a developing 
country because a perception of unfairness and lack of legitimacy of the tax system 
could lead to resistance in the form of non-compliance (Memon, 2010:79). 
Furthermore, the perception of unfairness could even lead to the disruption of the 
social and political fabric of the country18. If individuals feel that that they are being 
taxed unfairly, it is more likely than not that they will offer some type of resistance by 
either evading tax, confronting the government via protest action, or deliberately 
disadvantage those that they feel are being favored by the tax system. 
 
In addition, judgement about horizontal equity in a tax system needs to be adjusted 
to the types of taxpayers, income levels vis-a-vis cost of administration and the 
extent of non-compliance in a country. This is because any attempt to capture minor 
income differences of small businesses in large informal economies in order to tax 
equals equally could result in increased complexity in the tax code, which ultimately 
would reduce compliance and undermine horizontal equity. Taxpayers are more 
likely to be non-compliant if they are made to constantly pay immaterial amounts 
and the revenue obtained from collecting these amounts may be less than the cost 
to collect the tax. More aptly, for small business in developing countries, it appears 
that a simple tax can encourage compliance and improve the perception of fairness 
and equity (Memon, 2010:80).  
Neutrality is a key feature of horizontal equity. However, like efficiency, neutrality in 
the context of equity might also not be secured under a wealth tax system. With 
regards to wealth taxes the following three aspects of neutrality could be 
undermined (Memon, 2012:937): 
 
i. Neutrality in tax treatment of losses and income 
                                                      
17
 OECD e-Commerce Report: Taxation Framework Conditions; A report by Committee on Fiscal Affairs; OECD,8 October 1998,6 
<http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/3/1923256.pdf> 
18
 David F Burg,’A world History of Tax Rebellions: An Encyclopedia of Tax Rebels, Revolts and Riots from Antiquity to the Present’(2004) 
128-130.  
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ii. Neutrality of tax burden irrespective of the risk in the sectors 
iii. Neutrality in respect of even the compliance procedures and related 
costs   
Equity, as a criterion of consideration when designing a tax system, requires a 
comprehensive understanding of two guiding principles: the ‘benefit’ principle and 
the ‘ability to pay’ principle. In practice, these two principles produce different 
policy recommendations and offer different measures of tax reform. Achieving 
equality requires the alignment of a taxpayer’s willingness to pay with the 
benefits he or she will derive. Taxpayers are also willing to pay tax if there are no 
personal benefits associated with their tax payments, as long as they are privy to 
what the tax is being utilized for. The converse of this, however, is that where 
taxpayers are constantly required to pay additional taxes, with no significant 
change to the state of the economy, then there could be potential resistance from 
those taxpayers. Despite this, the ‘benefit’ principle is a significant and 
individualistic standard that is applicable when evaluating a tax system because 
it mirrors the idea of public policy and the role of voluntary exchange (DTC, 
2018:32-33) 
3.3.1.1 The benefit principle 
“In practice it is often difficult to gain consensus on what taxpayers are 
willing to pay versus what they stand to benefit. Often, economic literature 
faces confrontation with discussions on the problem of substituting actual 
consent by hypothetical consent. An advocate of wealth taxation, for 
instance, may contend that an individual holding a vast stock of wealth 
accrues more benefits in the form of protection of property rights than a 
neighbour who earns a modest amount of labour income who has little 
without wealth. It appears evident that possessing assets, and not merely 
the incomes that flow from them, must be a valid consideration for taxation 
in accordance with the benefit principle” (DTC, 2018:33).  
A counterargument to the above, however, would be the fact that this leans 
towards continually taxing the same amounts. Wealthy individuals are more likely 
to have a diverse portfolio of assets. Each of these assets are taxed depending 
on the types of transfers that the taxpayer decides to make. Adding a wealth tax 
to this has the potential of double taxation on these assets and would be 
inherently unfair. This is why wealth tax in the form of Estate Duty would be more 
favourable than the annual wealth tax, as the assets would only be taxed once - 
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upon the death of the taxpayer (DTC,2018:34). This will be elaborated on in 
Chapter five of this dissertation.  
In the discussion on the benefit principle, it is important to note that, at minimum, 
the benefit principle offers some meaning when evaluating proposals to do with 
introducing a net wealth tax. The applicability of the benefit principle, however, 
requires caution, as it applies to specific cases, as well as economies; therefore, 
a decision to adopt a wealth tax should not rely only on the benefit principle. 
Owning assets or property need not mean that the holder is able to pay taxes on 
wealth or wealth transfer.  
3.3.1.2. The ability to pay principle 
In practice, the ability-to-pay principle makes use of stocks of wealth and income 
to proxy for an individual’s ability to pay. These proxies, however, not only 
provide an incomplete picture of actual welfare, but the tax payments are also not 
a full representation of the actual welfare losses. A wealth tax that provides 
exemptions on some assets (e.g. pension funds or owner-occupied housing) can 
create horizontal inequities. When taxes on wealth are levied, one of the 
intended goals is to ensure that the tax is progressive in nature — implying that a 
larger estate should pay more tax relative to a smaller estate. This can be 
achieved through a tax-free threshold or through setting representation of the 
actual welfare losses.  
By only using the ability-to-pay principle, it is not easy to arrive at a 
recommendation for the design of an annual wealth tax. For instance, 
complexities arise when individual A inherits wealth, such as a government bond, 
but does not have a job and relies on interest payments for consumption while 
Individual B has a job, owing to his university degree, but has neither wealth nor 
savings. Therefore, imposing a wealth tax becomes complicated especially when 
factoring in human capital in the wealth tax base (in the case of B). At the same 
time, introducing a wealth tax that focuses only on taxing financial assets sets A 
at a disadvantage because he or she will not be able to sustain the same level of 
consumption after wealth taxation (DTC, 2018:34). 
The taxpayer needs to have the ability to bear a tax’s burden and not merely the 
ability to pay it (Smith, 1776; Vivian, 2006:84). A balance is necessary between 
the state’s ‘inexorable’ pursuit of revenue and the citizen’s right to survive 
(Vivian, 2006:84-85; Montesquieu, 1748:XIII.1). In other words, the equity theory 
is relevant. Taxpayers in equal positions should have equal tax commitments 
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(horizontal equity) while wealthier taxpayers ought to shoulder a larger tax load 
(vertical equity) (Farrar, 2011; Vivian, 2006).  
Equity has been achieved by ensuring that vast amounts of capital are not left 
untaxed in the hands of a wealthy minority and by taking cognizance of the need 
for the wealthy to spare the poor an undue tax burden (Katz Commission, 
1997:46; Meade, 1978:12; Stiglitz, 1976; SARS, 2000).  
Boadway, Chamberlain and Emmerson (2010:777-786) concur with this 
argument for wealth taxes. According to them, wealth can be seen as an 
opportunity to enhance one’s well-being and a fair and just tax system should 
therefore seek to ensure equality in opportunities. In other words, a fair tax 
system will ensure that the benefits that accrue to the individual that is a holder of 
wealth should also be taxed. 
To clarify this statement, Sandford et al. (1975:6) use an example first 
recognized by Lord Kaldor, the Indian Minister of Finance in 1956. He compares 
a beggar to a man that holds his entire fortune in gold. Neither of them earns any 
income for as long as the man decides not to sell his gold. The man owning the 
gold has a far greater ability to pay taxes. This man can use his gold as security 
to finance other personal needs, while the beggar has no such option. It seems 
only fair that the man owning the gold should be taxed on this benefit that he can 
use to his advantage. From this example it is clear that a wealth tax will improve 
horizontal equity 
3.3.2. Vertical equity 
 Adam Smith states the following with regards to vertical equity:  
‘The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible in the proportion to their respective abilities.’ 
 
This principle suggests that, in order for the country to raise more income from tax, 
those that earn relatively more income should pay proportionally more. The 
objective of this is to achieve income and wealth redistribution between the wealthy 
and the poor (Memon, 2010:78).  
Additionally, progressivity in wealth tax designs is almost an unachievable task. In 
turnover-based tax regimes, the high turnover does not necessarily yield high 
margins and, beyond that, any attempt to introduce progressivity in this design 
requires the creation of more categories through grading in the tax rates. 
Consequently, a progressive turnover-based design would not result in simplicity, 
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the reason for which it was introduced in the first place. In an asset-based tax 
regime, each extra Rand of investment (increase in assets) yields extra revenue 
and therefore by default, taxes those proportionally more who have more assets: a 
form of vertical equity (Memon, 2012:938). 
Moreover, any attempt to achieve vertical equity by charging very high rates of tax 
may cause further loss of neutrality. In particular, it runs the risk of losing neutrality in 
the following two facets: neutrality in loss/income; risk and compliance burden. 
Consequently, the harmful effects of such an approach may outweigh the merits. On 
the other hand, using constant marginal tax rates secures a reasonable degree of 
vertical equity through a proportionate increase in tax burden with increasing 
income. This also reduces tax planning incentives and consequent inequities. 
Further, a constant marginal tax rate is also relatively easy to incorporate into an 
asset-based tax regime because it is difficult to find a single tax rate for all business 
sectors in other tax designs. 
It has, however, been argued that vertical equity penalises the economically efficient 
to the detriment of the tax base. A wealth tax’s ability to redistribute wealth and 
achieve vertical equity becomes tantamount to the state ‘turning the strong into the 
weak; the healthy into the sick and the wise into the stupid to make them equal’ 
(Voster, 2000:125). In this way, equity may be dismissed as lacking pragmatism. 
Indeed, the quantification of households’ abilities to pay taxes may be too difficult to 
be a feasible justification for a wealth tax (Coetzee, 1998:10-12). 
 
3.3.3. Summary for vertical and horizontal equity 
Horizontal equity is essential for the perception of fairness so as to encourage 
compliance, while vertical equity is essential for distribution of wealth. However, 
as Memon points out, vertical equity is a difficult task to achieve in large 
developing economies and, therefore, may be given the least preference 
(Memon,2010:79). 
For taking decisions regarding the horizontal equity in a tax system, it may be 
conceded from the outset that 'measuring equity is not easy'. Qualitative 
evaluation is not possible due to the multiplicity of the variables involved and 
innumerable categories and levels of income in an economy. Nevertheless, since 
neutrality of a tax measure (as neutrality ensures uniform treatment for all 
persons and industrial sectors) is the basis for both efficiency and equity 
principles, the findings of the analysis regarding the efficiency principle will be 
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relevant to horizontal equity. Vertical equity, on the other hand, can be assessed 
by observing the extent of progressivity in a tax system. 
Notwithstanding the aim of generating revenue and achieving the ideal of an 
egalitarian society, the design of taxes on wealth and wealth transfers intends to 
achieve some degree of equity. These taxes, however, fall short of some 
features of an efficient, effective and equitable tax system. Trotman-Dickenson 
(1996) relates the various principles of a good taxation system to wealth and 
wealth transfer taxation: Equity: the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay (DTC, 
2018:32-33) 
 
3.4. Conclusions drawn from the chapter 
This chapter of the dissertation aimed to assess whether an annual net wealth tax aligns 
with the principles of a good tax system, as envisioned by Adam Smith. The Chapter 
looked specifically at the canons of simplicity, efficiency and equity.  
Firstly, the canon of simplicity required an assessment of whether the wealth tax would not 
be onerous on the taxpayer and whether it would not cost the country exorbitant amounts 
to administer. Cost of compliance and collection as well as convenience to pay are the two 
most important principles when assessing the simplicity of a tax system.  
The cost of compliance was found to be too high for the wealth tax, as it is a 
comprehensive tax (DTC, 2018:36). Further to this, the wealthy have access to resources 
that enable them to seek expert tax advice that can lessen their tax burden. In this instance 
the burden to pay tax falls on those who are less wealthy and have no choice but to pay as 
they do not have access to such advice or sufficient means to implement it.  
Collection costs are also high because the assets would need to be assessed and valued 
every year. Moreover, in general, the administration costs associated with wealth and 
wealth transfer are quite high.  
Secondly, efficiency of a tax is assessed based on whether it does not leave those that 
ultimately bear the burden of the tax worse off. Every tax is said to possess the power to 
distort one’s wellbeing to some extent. The burden of wealth tax, in particular, is intended to 
be shouldered by the wealthy. However, as discussed above, the wealthy have resources 
that enable them to either avoid the burden of tax or disinvest and migrate. This leaves the 
middle class or the retired citizens vulnerable to bearing the burden of the tax and this an 
unfair distortion to their wellbeing.  
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The wealth tax, therefore, does not align with the canon of efficiency because of the 
potential it has to shift the tax burden.  
Lastly, the term equity usually has two facets to it namely: horizontal and vertical equity.  
Horizontal equity speaks to the fairness of the tax system by stating that taxpayers who 
earn in the same tax bracket should be taxed the same amounts. Horizontal equity is vital 
in a tax system for a number of reasons. This equitable treatment in a tax system is 
synonymous with fairness of the tax system and considered to be a cornerstone for 
encouraging voluntary compliance amongst taxpayers.  
The ‘ability to pay’ and ‘benefit’ principles are the two cornerstones of horizontal equity. The 
‘ability to pay’ principle prioritizes that an individual need to have the ability bear the tax 
burden and not merely the ability to pay it. This principle requires that the state strike a fair 
balance between the need to increase revenue collections and the wellbeing of the 
taxpayers.  
The ‘benefit’ principle states that taxpayers are always willing to pay taxes where they can 
observe a benefit from such taxes. The incessant increase in the taxation on the wealthy 
could see taxpayers losing their morale and more so when they witness misuse of state 
resources by the government.  
An annual net wealth tax does not align with the ideals of horizontal equity on all counts. 
The tax is an unfair tax as it undermines the fact that taxpayers who do not have the ability 
to bear the tax burden will be the ones who are ultimately responsible for paying the tax. 
Furthermore, it discourages the taxpayers morale to continue paying tax where there is no 
tangible benefit that can be observed.  
Vertical equity requires that taxpayers who are wealthy pay proportionally more tax than 
those who are not. This does not align with the principles of equity as it undermines the tax 
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Chapter Four: The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Wealth 
Tax 
“A wealth tax is usually motivated by the need to address one or both of two primary needs, 
namely, the need to address economic inequalities and the need for additional tax revenue. 
South Africa faces a dual challenge of continuing budget deficits in the face of very low 
economic growth which, in turn, places a substantial amount of pressure on sustainable growth 
in tax revenue and the ability to deal with the second challenge, being high inequality” 
(Arendse and Stack, 2017:1).  
There are many substantial arguments for an annual wealth tax and, as mentioned above, it is 
intended that such a tax should address the prevailing economic inequality. However, the 
introduction of a new wealth tax carries with it some disadvantages as well. Some known 
disadvantages are the risk of capital flight, low tax yields and increased tax evasion. It is 
therefore imperative to assess whether the economic set back and costs can be justified as 
being a necessary and worthwhile investment in pursuit of a greater long-term goal in the 
overall evaluation of whether such a new tax would be in the best interests of the country.19 
This chapter of the dissertation will look at the arguments for and those against a wealth tax. 
This chapter will then juxtapose these arguments and form a conclusion with regards to 
whether a wealth tax would currently be feasible for South Africa, in light of these advantages 
and disadvantages. 
4.1. Advantages of a wealth tax 
1. Reducing inequalities 
The strongest argument put forward for imposing an annual wealth tax is its potential to 
reduce inequalities. The main question is whether it is justified that certain people be 
deprived to rights of life and liberty as a result of extreme poverty? All this while a tax on 
the world’s wealthiest people possesses the potential to alleviate poverty and reinstate 
basic human rights to the poor (Glennerster, 2012:324). 
 
It is in developing countries like South Africa that the legacies of colonialism have left 
repercussions like inequality. As mentioned in chapter one of this dissertation these 
legacies have led to a myriad of tensions in developing countries. An annual wealth tax 
is said to have the potential to bridge the inequality gap by taxing the wealthy and 
utilising the funds therefrom to aid the poor (Gordon & Rudnick, 1996:6). This was the 
main motivation behind Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu calling for a tax on wealthy 
South Africans (Beeld, 2011).  
                                                      
19 Arendse, J. & Stack, L., 2018, ‘Investigating a new wealth tax in South Africa: Lessons from international experience’, Journal of Economic 
and Financial Sciences 11(1), a175. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.4102/jef.v11i1.17 
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An annual wealth tax could encourage a more moral society (Gordon & Rudnick, 
1996:5). This is in the sense that wealthy citizens will be taking more responsibility by 
utilizing their wealth to aid in the socioeconomic issues, such as poverty, that are faced 
by South Africa. Wealth confers non-economic benefits as well as influence over the 
government and on state decisions. Examples of such influence is the ability that wealth 
has to buy stakes in state owned enterprises, significant shares in the banking and 
mining sectors.  
Sandford et al. (1975:10) agrees with the argument for an annual wealth tax but only up 
to a certain extent. According to them the annual wealth tax will have as much or as 
little impact in the reduction of inequality as a progressive tax system would. 
Progressive tax systems have been in place in various countries all over the world and 
yet inequality has been on the rise in the last 30 years.  
The annual wealth tax would have a better chance of being successful at reducing 
inequalities in the event that it is set at extremely high rates so that wealthy individuals 
cannot meet their tax liabilities in a particular year from the income earned. In the event 
that an individuals’ income and annual wealth tax liability would exceed their earnings in 
a year, they would have no choice but to realise these assets to meet the obligation. 
This is hardly a productive suggestion as it would diminish the individuals’ wealth and 
capital flight would be unavoidable (Papp, 2014:17).  
An annual wealth tax would also enable inherited wealth to be taxed. It can be said that 
individuals that are able to live on wealth possess an unfair advantage. In the event that 
inherited assets are taxed, the beneficiaries would not be left to generate minimal 
income as they would be forced to work to keep up with inflation as well as the tax to 
avoid the asset from diminishing. This would also prevent people from permanently 
leaving the work force and could result in higher productivity and the development of 
enterprises (Papp, 2014:18). South Africa perhaps needs the older generation in the 
work force to provide the younger generation with an opportunity to work and generate 
wealth. 
In summary, the reduction of inequalities may be effective where tax on inherited wealth 
is increased, but this may be achieved through more rigorous death taxes. Any other 
attempt to reduce inequalities through an high annual wealth tax would possibly force 
individuals to move elsewhere and would inevitably tax wealth saved from the proceeds 
of labour and not only inherited wealth.  
 
2. Reducing the risk of tax avoidance 
According to Sanford et al (1975:6) tax avoidance can be avoided through the 
implementation of an annual wealth tax. He states that, if taxpayers are required to 
declare their assets annually then taxpayers would be less inclined to postpone the 
realisation of certain assets. Chapter three provided an opposing argument to this, 
however, by stating the annual wealth tax could encourage the wealthy to evade tax. 
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The wealthy are more likely to have access to resources such as tax advisors that can 
assist them with ways to avoid pay tax.  
 
It is very difficult to determine how significant tax evasion and tax planning would be if 
an annual wealth tax were to be imposed. Certain studies however allude to the fact 
that this phenomenon might be more substantial than what is to be expected.  
 
The annual wealth tax would ensure that additional information is readily available to the 
revenue authorities in order to enable them to cross-check the data accumulated from 
income tax streams (Papp, 2014:15). Papp believes that a person’s increase in wealth 
and his increase in income should closely correlate. Any unprecedented deviations from 
this relationship should be closely monitored and investigated so as to reduce the 
practice of tax evasion (Gordon & Rudnick, 1996:3). This could serve as an additional 
method to also assist the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) of ensuring fair and 
complete tax returns.  
 
 
3. Encourage the efficient use of resources 
 
An annual wealth tax could ensure that unproductive assets could be converted into 
more productive assets. For example, a person who owns a barren piece of land is not 
generating any income and would be paying the same amount of tax as someone who 
is utilizing the land to generate income. The owner of the land would be forced to then 
start cultivating or developing the land so as to generate income to assist in paying the 
tax based on the value of the land.  
 
However, this argument does not take into consideration the fact that individuals could 
be using those assets for philanthropic reasons. Tax is not the only way to accomplish 
redress and assist with socioeconomic issues. To add on to the example above, the 
farmer of the barren land could be allowing people to live on the land rent-free and by 
forcing him to generate income, he would be forced to charge indigent people rent in 
order to pay the wealth tax and on which he would also pay tax.  
 
Assets that earn a low yield will be exchanged for assets that produce a higher return, 
thus potentially distorting the market. Another example is a cash deposit that is earning 
a low interest return. Investors could be incentivised to invest their cash in investments 
that yield higher returns (Sandford, et al 1975:7-8). This could therefore encourage 
investments and eventually potentially increase the demand for labourers and ultimately 
address some of the socioeconomic issues faced in South Africa (Papp, 2014:16).  
 
It must be pointed out, however, that this dissertation is not oblivious to the fact that the 
views expressed in this section are based on a theoretical application of how individuals 
react to best ensure the retention of the value of their resources. Theory does 
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sometimes deviate from reality. For instance, in countries where a marginal tax rate is 
imposed on income along with modest capital gains, a wealth tax might still not be able 
to lure investors to invest in higher yielding businesses (Sandford et al., 1975:12).  
 
In summary the arguments above would be more likely to hold true in normal market 
conditions where taxpayers are equipped to optimise their available resources. It then 
still remains to be determined whether or not imposing an annual wealth tax will be a 
more efficient use of resources for current South Africa.  
 
4. Source of funding 
The ideal scenario would be one where the tax burden would fall on a small part of the 
society while the income generated therefrom would be enough to finance a large 
portion of the required government spending. This would be the situation that would 
arise in the event that wealth was taxed (Schnellenbach, 2007:5). Even though only a 
small portion of society is impacted, this scenario would cause an unprecedented 
amount of pressure on the portion of society that is affected by a tax on wealth. This is 
of course an ideal situation that makes sense theoretically, however, looking at the 
lessons from international countries in chapter two of this dissertation, annual wealth 
taxes have not generated enough revenue to make a significant difference. 
 
The ideals of the annual wealth tax are to not only tax newly acquired wealth but to also 
tax wealth that has been created from many generations before. This would effectively 
allow for a large tax base which would be likely to contribute a a significant amount to 
SARS even if a low tax rate would be applied (McKinnon,2012).  
 
4.2. Disadvantages of a wealth tax 
 
1. Practical difficulties 
The most significant argument presented by the opponents to the introduction of the 
wealth tax is that it poses many practical administrative difficulties. The main question, 
when interrogating the practical difficulties associated with administering the wealth tax 
is: will the benefits attached to implementing the annual wealth tax exceed the costs of 
implementing the tax? Further, will the benefits outweigh the practical difficulties 
associated with the implementation of this tax (Papp, 2014:19)?  
The most logical practical difficulties are listed below: 
 
• Valuation of assets: “Asset valuation is a critical step for the imposition of the 
annual wealth tax. Valuation of assets can however prove to be very subjective. 
Valuations could be susceptible to the risk of being under- or over-stated. The 
accurate valuation of assets such as private businesses or properties has often 
proven to be a very difficult task and requires the services of an expert. This in 
turn results in an additional cost burden for the taxpayer and tax administration 
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as they would have to expend resources such as time and money to have this 
done” (Sandford et al., 1975:251). As mentioned before valuation difficulties 
could cause the fairness of the tax system to be jeopardised as under-valuation 
could lead to certain individuals still not paying according to their abilities 
(Sandford et al., 1975:12). 
 
Deborah Tickle makes another important argument regarding the valuation of 
assets. She states that if assets are then used as a measurement of wealth, then 
it is only reasonable to use these assets as a measure when these assets have 
been realised or transferred. She aptly provides an example of shares and 
property for which the value is prone to the fluctuations in the market. If an 
annual wealth tax was implemented then individuals who hold such assets would 
be considered to qualify for the annual wealth tax, however,  if, for example, the 
market crashes the underlying value of those assets may be much less when 
realised. This means that the wealth that those individuals were perceived to 
have was not ‘real’ in the first place. A recent example of this in South Africa is 
the Steinhoff case in 2017. The shares of this company lost about 90% of their 
value and caused huge losses for investors after it was found that executives in 
the company had been inflating profit and asset values for years. Such examples 
of ‘fictitous value’ are not isolated and there have been many similar scenarios 
over the last decade e.g. Tongaat Hulett, EOH, VBS, Sasol and even 
Woolworths where there was no fraud involved. 
 
Tickle does acknowledge the fact that South Africa has Estate Duty, donations 
tax, transfer duty and STT that aptly tax these assets on transfer. However, it is 
in relation to the annual wealth tax that she makes this point (Prof Deborah 
Tickle, 2019).  
 
There is thus also still great uncertainty around what the annual wealth tax could 
be levied on. It is reported that most of South Africa’s wealth is concentrated in 
retirement funds. This begs the question of whether retirements funds should 
then be subjected to the tax? How should it be justified that money invested in 
retirement funds would be exempt and that money in the bank because people 
either saved for their own retirement or withdrew from their retirement funds 
would be taxable? Cognisance must also be had of the fact that even though 
South Africans do prioritize investing their money in retirement funds, it does not 
mean that they are wealthy (Tickle,2019). Further to these questions is the 
consideration of whether or not the wealth tax should have an age limit. Or would 
this tax be levied based only on the extent of one’s “wealth”? These are all 
considerations that have not yet been dealt with and leave great uncertainty 
around the architecture of such a tax.  
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• Ownership of assets: “The uncovering of ownership of assets, specifically in 
developing countries has been described by different commentators on wealth 
taxes to be the biggest shortcoming of the wealth tax” (Gordon & Rudnick, 
1996:9). 
 
• Double taxation: The wealth tax proponents will have to face the implication of 
tax on worldwide assets. Today most tax systems focus on worldwide assets or 
income as the tax base for residents and this is often combined with a source-
based tax for non-residents. Furthermore, individuals who are considered to be 
wealthy will incur an annual wealth tax on their assets and may still incur death 
taxes on these assets when they die. 
 
These methods of taxing have often led to double or triple taxation for individuals 
that are residents in one country and own assets or earn income in other 
countries. This then means that an annual wealth tax might also be based on a 
taxation of world-wide assets and could impose the risk to double taxation, as 
described above.  
 
“The double taxation could be prevented through a double tax agreement, the 
only problem being that very few current double tax agreements include wealth 
taxes or the timing of when the tax should be administered” (Gordon & Rudnick, 
1996:22). This certainly holds true for South African double tax agreements. A 
huge effort would be required to ensure double tax agreements are updated to 
include all the aspects of a wealth tax as well (Papp, 2014:20). 
 
• Cost of collection: The administration around effectively imposing a wealth tax 
would require a hefty effort from a number of different players. A large number of 
staff is required by the revenue collector (SARS) to check and cross check 
information provided in these types of returns. Although there are administrators 
for the current wealth taxes in South Africa, there is still room for improvement 
with regards to streamlining the administration processes. It has already been 
mentioned in this dissertation that the revenue expected to be contributed by the 
wealth tax is negligible and therefore could outweigh the benefit of imposing such 
a tax. The countries with the highest percentage contribution from wealth taxes 
are Luxembourg and Switzerland. These countries’ wealth taxes contribute a 
mere 3.5% of total income from taxes (Hansson, 2002:3).  
 
Given all the practical difficulties mentioned above, the implementation of a wealth tax 
may be a costly and difficult exercise. The costs of implementing a wealth tax could 
easily outweigh the benefits of implementing a wealth tax if the tax is aimed at a small 
group of taxpayers. 
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2. Reduction in incentive to save 
An annual wealth tax could reduce incentives to save (Boadway et al., 2010: 785). This 
possibility was also acknowledged by Sandford et al. (1975:13). The reason for the 
argument being that the tax base of an annual wealth tax would be accumulated wealth 
or, in other words, savings. In fact, in a scenario where individuals are faced with a 
decision to save and pay taxes on those savings or to spend the money on their own 
personal needs, the far more likely outcome might be for said individuals saving less 
and rather spend the money on current personal needs or desires. This might also, to a 
certain extent, discourage enterprise development in cases where an enterprise has 
been specifically entered into for purposes of creating future savings (Papp, 2014:22). 
 
Professor Deborah Tickle published an article in the September/October issue (issue 
78) of the ‘Tax Talk’ magazine. The article states reasons that substantiate why the 
wealth tax would not be a great idea for the South African context. One of the reasons 
she mentions supports the ideas above regarding how the tax could discourage South 
African taxpayers from saving. Tickle states in her article that if people anticipate the 
fact that an annual wealth tax will be imposed on them they are far less likely to save 
any money in the bank or in retirement funds. In fact, as indicated above, a far more 
likely response will be disinvestment in the country in favour of a country that has more 
favourable tax incentives which would further erode South Africa’s tax base. The less 
morally inclined citizens might also take the option of hiding their assets and evade the 
tax altogether. 
 
3. Impact on entrepreneurship 
There seems to be a relationship between an annual wealth tax imposed and the rate of 
self- employment or entrepreneurship. Hansson (2008:141) discovered that there is a 
relationship that exists between an imposed wealth tax and the rate of self-employment. 
Hansson was able to discover this after comparing the number of self-employed 
individuals throughout the OECD.  
Hanssons work indicates that countries that imposed a wealth tax showed a 33% lower 
self-employment rate compared to that of countries that did not impose a wealth tax 
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Figure 2: The average self-employment rates with and without a wealth tax between 1980-2003 
 
Source: Hasson, 2008:145 
 
There were two main reasons which were brought to the fore to serve as a justification 
for this: 
 
• Start-up companies need a high level of own capital as the risks associated with 
these kinds of businesses make external financing hard to obtain and very 
expensive. Availability of own capital is reduced through the introduction of more 
taxes. 
 
• The main driving force for bearing the risk of starting these types of businesses is 
the expected after-tax returns. A wealth tax reduces the after-tax return and 
therefore inhibits the main driving force (Hansson, 2008:141). 
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Various tests and comparisons indicated that the removal of a wealth tax can 





4. Unfairness of a wealth tax 
One of the main arguments against an annual wealth tax is that it is an unfair tax. This 
idea was explored in chapter four of this dissertation and presented how the tax could 
be perceived as unfair when analysing it relative to horizontal equity. One other 
example to illustrate how an annual wealth tax could be unfair is that certain individuals 
prefer to earn income early in their lives and work harder during that part of their life 
cycle. These individuals would aim to accumulate as much as possible and convert this 
into assets that can ensure an income during a latter part of their life cycle so that they 
could then sit back and enjoy the fruits of earlier hard labour. An annual wealth tax 
could potentially discriminate against such individuals that decided on this approach 
compared to an individual who preferred earning just enough to support his current 
needs and keep on working until it is no longer possible (Boadway et al., 2010:779-
780).  
 
This discrimination could lead to more people preferring not to accumulate wealth and 
ultimately become state dependent for their most basic needs during old age. 
Additionally, it would discourage the culture of investing in certain assets that would 
earn income for them in their later years. Therefore, the implementation of an annual 
wealth tax would not only be unfair, but would also be counterproductive (Papp, 
2014:24). 
 
Another reason why an annual wealth tax is claimed to be unfair is the fact that it erodes 
wealth. The tax base includes assets and not an increase in assets. Therefore, the 
same assets are taxed year after year and this gradually erodes wealth (Papp, 
2014:24). This tax not only eliminates the economic futures of individuals, but it also 
hints at communism (Makoti, 2012:73). Such policy can only be justified for political 
reasons (Schnellenbach, 2007:1). A wealth tax in itself can be seen as an exponential 
tax as it is levied on assets that were acquired from after tax earnings (Makoti, 
2012:73). 
 
“Wealth taxes can also be viewed as discriminating against personal small businesses. 
It is widely recognised that imposing wealth taxes on both companies and individuals 
will lead to double tax. However, the imposing of wealth taxes on individuals would only 
create an unfair disadvantage for these personal businesses competing against other 
larger companies for the same projects” (Ristea & Trandafir, 2010:304). These personal 
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businesses would have to charge higher rates to ensure the same after-tax returns as 
their corporate competitors. 
Based on the above an annual wealth tax can be seen as inefficient and unfair in more 
than one way and to various different individuals. This would be particularly counter-
productive in a country such as South Africa, which is currently attempting to encourage 
entrepreneurship and small business to salvage the economy.  
 
4. Capital drain 
The most significant implication of imposing an annual wealth tax on the citizens is the 
possibility of a capital drain, sometimes also referred to as a “brain drain” (Papp, 
2014:24). The modern world is increasingly becoming “smaller”. The cost of travelling 
and communication is lowering over time. Technology has eliminated barriers to the 
flow of capital; companies have become multi-national organisations that can easily 
transfer employees between countries. Workers can now choose where to stay and 
invest their hard-earned capital. One of the many factors influencing these decisions 
has been found to be taxes (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008:28). 
 
The extent of the impact of taxes on people’s decisions of where to live is not limited to 
income tax rates, but also extends to taxes on wealth. In theory any tax on wealth will 
encourage a capital flight up to the point where the returns on the capital exceeds any 
taxes thereon (Gordon & Rudnick, 1996:8). 
As was mentioned in chapter two of this dissertation many wealthy French citizens 
stated that the annual wealth tax in France was the reason behind their decision to 
emigrate to Belgium and Switzerland (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008:42). Countries such as 
Ireland also attributed the decision to abolish their wealth tax systems to capital drain 
(Ristea &Trandafir, 2010:304). 
 
Asa Hansson was inspired by this notion of capital flight to study the relationship 
between economic growth and wealth taxes. The study statistically investigated the 
correlations between economic growth and annual wealth taxes imposed by the 
revenue authorities for 20 OECD countries between 1980 and 1999 (Papp,2014:25). 
The study concluded that economic growth is stifled by between 0.02% and 0.04% for 
every 1% increase in the wealth tax rate (Hansson, 2002:18). This is ascribed to the fact 
that wealthy individuals migrate to countries with more favourable tax laws and where 
foreign assets are given preference over domestic assets (Hansson, 2002:2). 
 
Linda Papp reports that there have been studies that have shown that by increasing a 
wealth tax, such as estate tax or capital gains tax, the tax bases in the particular 
instances have shrunk (Papp,2014:25). This is a result of people crafting schemes to 
avoid paying taxes (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008:36-43). In some instances, the income 
tax base has also shrunk as a result of increased efforts by citizens to minimise their tax 
liability. These efforts include migrating to countries where the tax liability would be less 
onerous. Many economists believe that, due to this fact, a wealth tax does not 
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necessarily raise additional net revenue for governments (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008:43). 
This raises great concern in a country such as South Africa that already has wealth 
taxes, such as Estate Duty (amongst others, as mentioned in Chapter One) that has not 
been performing well and to replace or add to it with an annual wealth tax would not 
bode well. 
 
To reiterate, the introduction of annual wealth taxes also adversely affects a country’s 
future growth and job creating capabilities (Makoti, 2012:73). Entrepreneurs not only 
create their own wealth, they also create jobs and empower communities in the course 
of their business (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008:89). Alienating these individuals would thus 
be detrimental to a country. The unemployment rate in South Africa is currently at an all-
time high of 29% and introducing any other factors that even possess the potential of 
worsening this would, thus, be counterproductive.  
 
The alienation of business developers and entrepreneurs was also mentioned as one of 
the reasons why an annual wealth tax was never implemented in the United Kingdom 
(UK) (Glennerster, 2012:243). The decision not to implement a wealth tax in the UK was 
underpinned by the following reasons, after various reviews of the intended system (all 
of these relate in some way to the fact that the country would see a decline in capital 
invested and business activity): 
 
• “Citizens would be encouraged to seek non-citizen status which would lead to 
outflow of funds in the form of dividends and interest”. 
 
“Foreign employees, resident in the UK would also be subject to the tax. This 
would probably result in a large exodus of major foreign banks, insurance 
companies and shipping companies to neighbouring countries”. 
 
• “With fewer assets held in the UK the general level of business in the country 
would reduce”. 
 
“The South African economy cannot afford these negative effects at this point in time, even 
though South Africa is deemed less vulnerable due to factors such as the high future growth 
rate forecasted for Africa. It is therefore important to determine the total tax impact on an 
individual in South Africa, compared to other African countries” (Papp, 2014:26). 
 
 
4.3.  Conclusions on The Advantages And Disadvantages Of Imposing A Wealth Tax 
Based purely on the theory presented in this chapter it can be stated that the disadvantages of 
imposing an annual wealth tax outweigh the advantages thereof. It would seem that the 
advantages of imposing an annual wealth tax are largely based on theory and very little 
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evidence exists that these advantages are in fact justifiable in practice (Sandford et al., 
1975:12) 
 
The section that detailed the advantages for imposing an annual wealth tax have counter 
arguments pointing towards the opposite. Some examples are the following:  
• the advantage of improving horizontal equity is contradicted by the disadvantage 
of practical difficulties. This is due to the fact that the fairness would be 
compromised as a result of certain assets being difficult to value or even easy to 
omit from returns.  
• that the risk of avoidance of taxes would be lowered is countered by the 
argument that practical difficulties would cause incentive for even further 
avoidance. This could ultimately lead to tax immorality that affects taxpayer’s 
attitudes towards other types of taxes as well.  
• the reduction in inequality would only be effective in cases where wealth taxes 
are imposed at such high levels that it would cause capital flight. 
It does however seem that the additional tax can be politically motivated to try 
and reduce the effect of inequalities between different groups based on social 
injustices from the past albeit that, based on the research in this dissertation, this 
is unlikely to be achieved. 
 
As mentioned under the practical difficulties the reporting of assets for wealth tax purposes 
might be susceptible to undervaluation. Furthermore, individuals might be enticed to omit 
certain assets that are difficult to trace such as gold or jewellery from their returns. 
These factors would put a huge administrative burden on the revenue collector to ensure the 
accuracy of the returns. Tax evaders would certainly go out of their way to ensure that a cross 
check between income tax and an annual wealth tax would not reveal obvious substantial 
inconsistencies. The costs of this administration will prove high, due to the valuation difficulties 
mentioned above, and will still not provide perfect results (Sandford et al., 1975:12). 
 
A decision not to scrutinise and investigate the accuracy of the returns by the revenue collector 
could lead to an overall reduction in the level of seriousness and honesty of taxpayers 
completing any tax returns. Tax evasion creates a general contempt for law and has a 
tendency to feed itself. Tax immorality could therefore spread to other types of taxes already 
imposed. Good tax policies should avoid leaving any room for possible evasion. This argument 
therefore seriously questions the ability of the annual wealth tax to reduce tax evasion. 
 
Sandford et al. (1975:35) also concluded that “the comparison of wealth taxes alone has very 
little value as the total basket of taxes imposed on an individual should be compared to 
determine whether a country could justify the addition of another tax”. From a South African 
perspective, the overall basket of taxes imposed currently by South Africa on high net worth 
individuals will need to be compared. 
.  
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Chapter five: The Efficacy of existing Wealth Taxes in SA 
The historical development of wealth transfer taxes was researched by Muller20 (2010; 86-94) 
who documented it as follows: Wealth transfer tax first made its appearance in South Africa in 
the Cape of Good Hope colony during 1864 by way of a recipient-based succession duty. In 
1899 the old Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek introduced a transfer-based duty, while the colonials in 
the Natal and the Free State introduced a similar succession duty to the Cape of Good Hope in 
1905, by way of colonial legislation. The first national wealth transfer tax to be nationally 
promulgated was the Death Duty Act 29 of 1922 and, with its promulgation, all previous 
provisional legislation was repealed. This Act was repealed in 1955 when it was replaced by 
the Estate Duty Act, (No. 45 of 1955) (CP Basson,2015:13). 
South Africa currently has wealth taxes in the form of estate duty (levied in terms of the Estate 
Duty Act, No. 45 of 1955), Donations Tax (levied in terms of sections 54 to 56 of the Income 
Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962), transfer duty (levied in terms of the Transfer Duty Act, No. 40 of 
1949) and securities transfer tax (levied in terms of the Securities Transfer Tax Act, No. 25 of 
2007).  
The focus of this chapter will be on estate duty and donations tax rather than transfer duty and 
STT as the latter two are transaction taxes albeit that they fall into the category of wealth 
taxes. Thus, their retention if an annual wealth tax were to be implemented could be justified, 
whereas the estate duty and donations tax would generally be replaced by an annual wealth 
tax order to avoid any double tax effects (see discussion under estate duty in this chapter). 
Where considered relevant transfer duty and STT will nevertheless be referred to. 
In 2015 The DTC was requested to review the relevance of estate duty in South Africa. The 
first interim report issued by the DTC put forward reasons to justify the repeal of estate duty 
and listed three proposals as an alternative to this tax. The proposals were as follows:  
                                                      
20 Muller, E. 2010, A framework for wealth transfer taxation in South Africa, LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, viewed 27 August 2014 
< http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-10092010-142436> 
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1. “To repeal the Estate Duty Act completely and cease the concept of treating death as a 
taxable event”.  
2. “To amend the estate duty in order to achieve a simpler and more efficient system”. 
3. “To replace the present estate duty system with a new form of wealth tax”.  
This chapter of the dissertation will focus on the third proposal i.e.to replace estate duty with 
an annual wealth tax. It will start by providing a brief description of the South Africa’s current 
wealth taxes ie: donations Tax, transfer Duty and securities transfer tax. Secondly it will 
perform an in-depth analysis of estate duty and the literature that has been published 
suggesting the repeal of the tax and assess reasons behind this suggestion. It will also look at 
whether the proposal of replacing estate duty with an annual wealth tax would be to South 
Africa’s benefit.  
 
5.1. Donations Tax 
The income Tax Act defines a donation as “any gratuitous disposal of property or any 
gratuitous waiver or renunciation of a right”. A person becomes responsible for donations tax 
on any gift that is given or received for no consideration or at below market value without any 
obligation to pay it in return. The donor of the asset is responsible for the payment of the 
donations tax and it is payable within three months from the date of the donation. The donee 
becomes responsible for the payment of the tax in the event that the donor fails to pay the tax.  
Donations tax is effectively an advance payment of estate duty, as assets are transferred to 
beneficiaries throughout life and the tax is intended to prevent taxpayers from disposing their 
assets prior to death in order to avoid estate duty.  
There have been many reports on the fact that estate duty and donations tax collections have 
declined, both in real terms and in terms of their overall contribution to National Revenue. The 
total revenue collected from these two taxes is 0.17%. The DTC released two reports on estate 
duty, in 2015 and 2016, which confirm that, 
“South Africa has significantly underperformed in terms of revenue collections in respect of 
estate duty and donations tax; hence there is scope to increase performance in this regard. 
Given the massive wealth disparity in South Africa, it is clear that reform is needed in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of these taxes. The DTC recommended that, with some 
modification, the estate duty and donations tax regimes could better achieve the objective of 
reducing wealth inequality without necessarily implementing new forms of wealth taxation” 
(DTC,2015:6). 
This is a key point for the purposes of this dissertation and will be explored more in this 
section.   
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One of the amendments that were suggested by the Minister of Finance, in his 2018 speech 
and based partly on the DTC recommendations, was that the rates of estate duty and 
donations tax be levied at 25% (as against the current 20%) if the aggregate value of the 
property exceeded R30 million. If the aggregate value of the property was below R30 million, 
then donations tax would still be levied at 20% (SILKE, 2019:930). This amendment has been 
effective since 1 March 2018, however, the impact of this is not yet clear in relation to the total 
revenue collections. 
 
Another important improvement that was made to the estate duty and donations tax regimes 
was the introduction of section 7C which, although in a different form, also emanated from the 
DTC recommendations. The purpose of introducing this section was to prevent the avoidance 
of estate duty and donations tax through using trusts and interest free loans. Section 7C 
provides that where certain loans, advances or credit has been provided by a trust (or certain 
companies) by a connected person to a trust, this may result in the application of the donations 
tax provisions.  
 
For the provision to apply, the lender needs to be a natural person and if it is a company it 
must be at the instance of a natural person (who is a connected person to the company) 
(SILKE, 2019:935). The donations tax is payable on an amount of deemed interest not 
charged by the lender. In essence, the effect of the change is to negate the effect of 
transferring assets from the lender to the trust, such that their growth in value was removed 
from his or her estate and thus not taken to account for estate duty purposes on death.  
 
In line with the DTC recommendations, improvements were also made to the disclosure 
required in the annual tax returns for trusts, to enable SARS to evaluate in whose hands 
income earned by the trust should be taxed. This also ensures that SARS is able to verify that 
those persons’ tax returns reflect that income.   
 
Although the DTC recommendations to the amendment of the Donations Tax legislation in its 
2016 Estate Duty Interim Report, which also included the review of the inter-spouse abatement 
and bare dominium and usufructs arrangements (DTC, 2016:21-24) were not incorporated  
into the South African tax legislation in their recommended forms, the changes nevertheless 
made significant inroads into the shortfalls that existed in these wealth taxes. They also bear 
testament to the fact that there is further scope to improve on the current wealth taxes that 
exist in South Africa, rather than introducing a new annual wealth tax instead.  
 
 
5.2. Transfer Duty 
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“Transfer duty is a tax levied at progressive rates on the value of any property that is acquired 
by any individual or juristic entity, subject to the exemptions provided for in section 9 of the Act. 
It is the largest source of revenue in the “taxes on property” category as defined in the 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS)” (National Treasury, 2019:270).  
Transfer duty is levied on a wide range of assets that are defined as property. They include 
land and fixtures as well as real rights in land, rights to minerals, a share or interest in a 
residential property company, as well as shares in a share-block company. When property is 
acquired, transfer duty is imposed on the person acquiring the property. When rights 
associated with property are renounced, responsibility for the payment of the transfer duty lies 
with the person in whose favour, or for whose benefit, any interest in, or restriction upon, the 
use or disposal of property has been renounced.  
Transfer duty is payable within six months from the date of acquisition. The sale of a property 
directly or through a change in shareholding is subject to either VAT or Transfer duty. Where 
shares are sold, the property is included as part of a fair-valuation of the shares and the 
transaction is subject to transfer duty under specific anti-avoidance measures. For example, 
the sale of a vendor’s private residence, or the sale of property used by a vendor for the 
purposes of employee housing, will be subject to transfer duty as these supplies are made in 
the course of a VAT exempt activity and not in the course or furtherance of the enterprise 
carried on by the vendor. 
The migration of Transfer Duty payments onto SARS’ electronic e-filing platform in 2013 has 
improved the accuracy of information on property transactions and associated duties. From 1 
March 2015, the threshold of property values liable for transfer duties was increased to R750 
000. This was raised to over R900 000 from 1 March 2017. The duty is then levied on a sliding 
scale with a maximum rate of 13% to the extent that the value of any properties transferred 
exceeds R10mn. As a form of transactional land tax this rate is considered to be high when 
viewed against other global rates of property transfer taxes (National Treasury,2019:271).  
In 2018/19 a total number of 93 329 properties were transferred at a combined value of R188.9 
billion. This represented an increase from the 85 664 properties transferred in 2017/18 at a 
value of R179.0 billion. This resulted in Transfer Duty collections of R7.2 billion, which was  
down from the R7.7 billion received in 2017/18, representing 8.9% transaction volume increase 
year-on-year and a 6.2% decrease in Transfer Duty collections. The transaction volume 
increase in 2018/19 is surprising considering the tough economic conditions, but did not 
translate into added Transfer Duty collections as it was the lower value properties that added 
to the volume. In the current year, 75% (2018 - 74%) of the transfer volume accounted for 20% 
(2018 - 19%) of the Transfer Duty collected (National Treasury, 2019). 
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The average value of property transferred was R2 million (2017/18: R2.1 million) and the 
average Transfer Duty paid on these transfers was R77 606 (2017/18: R90 155). The Pareto 
analysis of the past two years reveals that 84% of the transaction volume contributed 30% of 
the transfer duties in 2018/19 while in 2017/18, 82% of the transaction volume contributed 28% 
toward transfer duties (National Treasury, 2019). 
Transfer Duty has performed well despite the poor economic climate and the stagnation of the 
property market in 2019. This is particularly encouraging and again reiterates the sentiments 
expressed above with regards to Donations Tax, specifically that there is room to leverage the 
use of other wealth taxes to increase the overall contributions by wealth taxes. Also, one of the 
reasons why the current wealth taxes are more efficient than an annual wealth tax is that they 
occur on transfer and, thus, at a fixed point in time when a fixed value can be determined, 
rather than taxing someone on variable values (potentially fictitious a.k.a Steinhoff) which over 
a period of time may bear no relation to the actual/ real amount of ‘wealth’ that is ultimately 
realized or seen on disposal of the asset.   
This tax aligns very well to the Adam Smith canons as it is simple, efficient and equitable (ie 
the rate is levied based on ability to pay ie the higher the value property you buy the more tax 
you pay) and certain (the value is clear on transfer, as third parties negotiate a price). It thus 
has very low administration costs. The current wealth taxes, in general, are more efficient than 
an annual wealth tax would be in that they occur on transfer and thus at a fixed point in time 
when a fixed value can be determined.  
 
5.4. Estate Duty 
The Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, as amended, provides for the imposition of estate duty on the 
estate of every person who died on or after 1 April 1955. 
The Estate Duty Act is administered and collected by the Commissioner of the South African 
Revenue Service (“SARS”). To enable this Office to perform this function efficiently, the Estate 
Duty Act has conferred wide powers thereon, particularly as far as control is concerned. SARS 
carefully examines all returns submitted to it and keeps an eye on the values allocated to 
estate assets (SILKE,2019). In this respect, section 5 of the Estate Duty Act is particularly 
important, since it describes how a deceased’s property must be valued for purposes of the 
Act and what monetary value must be attached to these assets. If SARS is not satisfied with 
the value attached to a particular estate asset, it may increase the value to an amount it 
considers realistic.  
Estate duty is charged upon the dutiable amount of the estate, calculated in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act. It is levied at the rate set out in the First Schedule (Lexis Nexis). As 
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indicated above, the rate is currently 20% on the dutiable value below R30mn and 25% above 
this figure.  
The Minister of Finance, Mr Pravin Gordhan, in his Budget Speeches delivered in Parliament 
in 2010, reiterated that the Revenue Authority was considering a major revamp of (and 
possibly the abolishment of) Estate Duty. The question that the Davis Tax Committee aimed to 
answer was the following: ‘What is an equitable combined effective Estate Duty package? 
(DTC, 2016).  
Both estate duty and capital gains tax are payable upon death, which is perceived as giving 
rise to double taxation. The Estate Duty raises limited revenue and is cumbersome to 
administer. Moreover, its efficacy is questionable: many wealthy individuals escape estate duty 
liability through trusts and other means. These two theories will be explored further in this 
section.  
The terms of reference extended to the Davis Tax Committee by the Minister of Finance 
instructed it to enquire into: 
“The progressivity of the tax system and the role and continued relevance of estate duty 
to support a more equitable and progressive tax system. In this inquiry, the interaction 
between capital gains tax and the estate duty should be considered. In real terms the 
contribution of estate duty collections has declined over the past 20 years21.” 
There is no prospect of capital taxes, in whatever form, being a “silver bullet” which could 
make a substantial difference to overall revenue from tax in South Africa. However, several 
other issues affecting donations tax and estate duty have emerged since 1997 that require 
examination, as part of an overall assessment (DTC, 2016:5). 
While South Africa is significantly underperforming in terms of revenue collection in respect of 
Estate Duty and Donations Tax and, hence, there is scope to increase performance in this 
regard, this country is, however, not unique regarding the small contribution made by wealth 
taxes. Many countries have no net wealth taxes, or estate, inheritance or gift taxes. In the 
Netherlands inheritance and gift tax yield 0.7% of tax revenues and 0.26% of GDP 
(DTC,2016:5).. 
The Katz Commission suggested that a targeted tax contribution for such taxes, of 1 to 1.5% of 
tax revenues, might be appropriate, which, translated into the context of the total collection for 
2013/14, would amount to approximately R10 billion to R15 billion per annum.  
5.4.1. The inefficiency of Estate Duty 
                                                      
21 National Treasury 2019 statistics 
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“Estate planning in essence is built on the principle of minimising taxes upon death by 
transferring assets to an entity, such as a trust, in order to ensure that the growth of the assets 
remain in the trust and not in the individual’s estate, as well as transferring control over the 
assets to the trustees.  
An inter vivos trust is the most common vehicle used for estate planning. A donor or founder 
establishes the trust while he is still alive and transfers all his/her assets to the trust. The 
control over the assets is then passed on to the trustees who own and manage them according 
to the provisions of the trust deed. This is done in order to avoid the section 3(3)(d) provision 
contained within the Estate Duty Act” (CP Basson,2015:19). “As indicated above, the main 
reason for moving assets into a trust is to avoid the Estate Duty on the growth in the value of 
the asset. Section 3(3)(d) of the Estate Duty Act states that any property that the deceased 
was competent to dispose of for his own benefit or for the benefit of his estate immediately 
prior to his death needs to be included as deemed property in the estate” (CP 
Basson,2015:19). 
The rise and high concentration of income and wealth at the upper end of the distribution have 
reinforced the call for the need to preserve or increase taxation on inheritance. International 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (2013) have recommended reinforcing 
property related taxes (such as Estate Duty) and decreasing current taxes on earned income. 
Family succession and inheritance incentives have been proven to play a role in the 
accumulation of high capital and corporate assets. Given that Estate Duty is factored into tax 
planning, this can elicit tax avoidance or the relocation of residents, since Estate Duty is not 
levied in several OECD countries while net wealth taxes have been eliminated in most 
countries (Mbewe S et al, 2019:179). 
The fact that the annual wealth tax also poses a great risk for tax avoidance and migration by 
wealthy taxpayers has been one of the major arguments for the opponents of the annual 
wealth tax in South Africa. However, when determining the burden of Estate Duty, it becomes 
less relevant to account for economic decisions made during years when the person was 
economically active because estate duty is only imposed after death. Therefore, most 
practitioners, tax experts and economists tend to advocate for estate duty over an annual 
wealth tax. The burden on beneficiaries, especially on those acquiring a large inheritance in 
which they played no part in acquiring, is considered small, lending support to the idea of 
taxing inheritance. This is motivated by the premise that inheritance taxation accounts for 
meritocratic ideas while striving to equalise opportunities between members of individual 
generations (Mbwew S et al, 2019:179)  
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However, the introduction of Section 7C, together with increased disclosure requirements for 
trusts (both local tax returns and the Common Reporting Standards22 for offshore trusts), have 
imposed limitations on the ability of the wealthy to estate plan through trusts. As mentioned 
earlier in this dissertation, the introduction of section 7C has prevented the use of trusts to 
avoid estate duty and donations tax.  
 
5.4.2. The raising of limited revenue compared to the administrative burden 
The National Treasury and SARS release a set of statistics on an annual basis. The 
subsequent analysis of these statistics is always beneficial in providing a well-rounded picture 
of the status quo regarding revenue collections, as well as the issues faced by the National 
Treasury and SARS with regards to tax. These statistics are collected and collated from SARS’ 
register of taxpayers and tax returns. 
Table 2, below, demonstrates the most recent statistics provided by SARS with regards to 
wealth taxes. Estate duty, transfer duty, securities transfer tax and donations tax are all 
grouped together in the table below under “taxes on property”. The table indicates that the 
percentage contribution of taxes of property to the revenue received by National Treasury is 
only 1.2% which is a decline from the 1.4%  in the 2017/2018 year. This is a contribution of 
R15.2 billion overall compared to R16.5 billion in 2017/2018. The total revenue collected in the 
2018/19 tax year was R1 287.7 billion which means that property taxes contributed 1,2%% to 
the South Africa tax revenue (National Treasury, 2019:).   
                                                      
22 These are global disclosure requirements placed on the banking system which enable tax authorities access to information on founders, 
trustees, and beneficiaries where any of these parties are not resident in the trust’s location. Further discussion is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.   
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Table 1: Tax revenue by main category, 2014/15-2018/19 
Source: The National Treasury 
The table below details the statistics specific to each tax from 2014/2015-2018/2019. The table 
details the number of transactions under each tax, the percentage total and, most importantly, 
the percentage year on year growth. The percentage year on year growth is particularly 
important for the purposes of this dissertation as it is an indication of how effective the tax is.  
The highest percentage increase, across all the taxes on wealth, was seen in the 2015/2016 
tax year and was 20.6%. The 2017 and 2018 tax years saw a very marginal increase of 4.1% 
and 5.9%. Interestingly, Section 7C and the amendment to the rates of estate duty and 
Donations Tax, as mentioned above were introduced with effective from 1 March 2017 and 1 
March 2018, respectively. To state that the decrease in the property taxes collection could 
solely have been a result of these amendments would be inconclusive, however, it does 
reinforce the fact there is scope to improve on the administration of existing wealth taxes as 
opposed to the introduction of an annual wealth tax. 
Finally, the 2019 year saw a decrease of -8%, which is a concerning statistic as regards the 
question of how effective these taxes are. The First National Bank weekly economics report, 
published on 8 March 2019, reported the following 
“The FNB national house price index came out this week and showed that prices started 
the year on a softer note, following a short rising trend stint in the last quarter of 2018 
(“4Q18”). This largely reflects increasing supply of homes up for sale and slowing 
demand, as espoused by FNB Property Valuers’ perceptions. The muted purchasing 
activity is in line with our expectations, given the drawn out weak economic environment 
as well as consumers’ unwillingness to commit to big-ticket purchases. Naturally, this 
consumer reticence is compounded by the customary uncertainties that come with 
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elections. Positively, however, longer-term trends from the 4Q18 FNB Estate Agents 
Survey show that there was already an uptick in activity in the high-net-worth and upper 
income areas. In spite of this, the FNB Valuers’ Market Strength Index is still below the 
neutral mark of 50 index points, against the backdrop of supply outstripping demand. 
This implies that the market is slightly in favour of buyers” (FNB, economic weekly 
report, 2019:1).  
The property market appeared to be stagnating from the end of 2018 and throughout 2019, 
which would explain the negative increase from a Transfer Duty perspective. The share market 
also performed poorly in 2019.  







Source: National Treasury 2018/19 statistics 
The collection of property taxes increased from R12.472 billion in 2015 to R15.252 billion in 
2019. However minimal this may be relative to overall revenue collections it does not fair badly 
relative to other jurisdictions. When looking at the Estate Duty figure, in particular, it can be 
seen that it has contributed a very low growth percentage of -9.7% in 2018/19. There was no 
official conclusive figure regarding what the total revenue collections were for this tax, 
however, it is clear that there were costs that were incurred to collect the tax as this is why it 
yielded a negative growth amount.  
In 2010 it was confirmed, by SARS, that the reason behind the call to review estate duty was 
the fact that the administrative burden of collecting this tax was high. There are also various 
stages that are necessary in the processing of an estate’s liquidation and distribution and 
some of these costs are not borne by SARS. An example is that often taxpayers are required 
to appoint their private lawyers as executors of the estate, who send the information to the 
Master of the High Court. SARS is then required to liaise with The Master of the High Court.  
All the points pertaining to estate duty above have been explored in this paper and it was 
concluded that compared to estate duty an annual wealth tax would increase the 
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administrative and cost burden to the relevant taxpayers and SARS as it will apply to all 
relevant taxpayers throughout their lives and not just at death. An annual wealth tax will require 
annual valuation, requiring the employing of valuers on an annual basis. 
It was stated in this section that estate duty was unable to yield the required revenue and is 
expensive to administer, which conflicts with the canon of simplicity as discussed in Chapter 
three. It then poses the question of how effective will an annual wealth tax be as compared to 
estate duty if both taxes do not align with the principles of a good tax? Furthermore, how is the 
annual wealth tax expected to exceed the efficacy of the estate duty?  
 
5.5. Conclusions on the efficacy of existing wealth taxes in South Africa 
One could say that the underlying principle of the Estate Duty Act is its imposition in respect of 
a deceased estate and the collection thereof, in order to create a source of revenue for the 
state. However, it now seems as if the Revenue Authorities are acutely aware of the fact that, 
due to sophisticated estate planning tools (available only to the wealthy), the cost associated 
with collecting Estate Duty is disproportionately high when compared to the amount of revenue 
collected for the fiscus. However, Estate Duty is already entrenched and well established in the 
South African tax system. The abolishment of this tax would result in the forfeiture of the 
around R15.2 billion of annual revenue that it has been able to fetch with no guarantee that an 
annual wealth tax could perform any better.  
Enforcing both the Estate Duty and an annual wealth tax would also not be efficient as the 
annual wealth tax is an advance payment of Estate Duty and Donations Tax and to have both 
would result in double (or if CGT is also included in the consideration, triple) taxation of the 
same amounts and even more administrative cost.  
This chapter aimed at looking at the current wealth taxes and assessed their performance to 
determine whether there was a need to introduce a new annual wealth tax. The chapter did 
this by looking at literature that has been published about Donations Tax, Estate Duty and 
Transfer Duty.  
Firstly, the chapter looked at Donations Tax and was able to obtain information on that the tax 
was not successful in collecting significant revenue. As can be seen in Table 1 above, Property 
Taxes (wealth taxes) collections have increased from R12.2 billion to R15.5 billion from 2015 
to 2019. The total collection of wealth taxes was reported to be 1.2% of the total revenue 
collections at the end of the 2019 tax year.   
Secondly, the chapter reviewed the recent statistics produced by the National Treasury on 
Transfer Duty and was able to conclude that this wealth tax was performing well. And has seen 
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steady increases from 1 March 2015 to 28 February 2019. Transfer Duty performed well 
despite the tough economic climate in 2018/19.  
Lastly, the DTC proposed that estate duty could potentially be replaced with a wealth tax in 
their first interim report. However, its later Estate Duty Report and Wealth Tax reports 
concluded that the administration of Estate Duty has a great amount of room and potential for 
improvement. Estate duty could be efficient in South Africa if these improvements could be 
instated. Amendments have already been instated in the administration of estate duty such as 
the introduction of Section 7C and the increase of the levy to 25% of property greater than R30 
million. This section of the chapter aimed to analyse whether this makes economic sense.  
It was discussed that, previously, trusts could be utilized to avoid the burden of estate duty. 
However, the introduction of Section 7C ensured that this has been limited, by deeming the 
interest-free portion of any loans provided by individuals, or at their instance, to a trust to be a 
donation subject to donations tax.  While there is no literature available yet on the impact of the 
section 7C and increased rate improvements to the tax legislation there was a decrease in the 
total property taxes collections between 2016 and 2019. The section did report that there has 
been significant stagnation in the property market since 2018 to 2019 as well as the poor 
performance of the share market in 2019. These factors could have contributed to the negative 
revenue collections yielded by property taxes overall and negated the benefit of the improved 
tax regimes.  
The chapter concludes that the recommendation, going forward, would be not to replace the 
existing wealth taxes with an annual wealth tax. Even though the performance of these taxes 
have been fairly poor, there are recent amendments and improvements that have been made 
that could promote effective administration of the wealth taxes. Moreover, in the Katz 
Commission Report  23 It was suggested that a targeted tax contribution for such taxes, of 1 to 
1.5% of tax revenues, might be appropriate. The percentage revenue collections have been 
reported to be 1.2% in 2019, which is in line with the goal.  
The current wealth taxes have been established and entrenched in the South African tax 
system and, thus, the introduction of a new tax would be a more expensive exercise than 
improving on the existing taxes, as well as risking a loss of tax when current collections are 
underperforming, in any event.  
  
                                                      
23 Katz Commission Report 2016 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
In 2018 the Davis Tax Committee was tasked with the responsibility to investigate the 
feasibility of introducing an annual wealth tax in South Africa. The debates around this topic 
have since continued to gain momentum and have been a contentious point for some 
taxpayers. The aim of this dissertation was to collect the literature that has been published on 
the proposal of an annual wealth tax in South Africa and to reach an objective conclusion as to 
whether this tax will be feasible for current South Africa. This dissertation took views from the 
proponents as well as the opponents of an annual wealth tax and analysed the tax against 
various tax principles, so as to come to a conclusion. 
This dissertation did this by, firstly, introducing the concept of the annual wealth tax. It then 
provided a brief background on the history of South Africa and brought to the fore some events 
from the country’s past that have resulted in the inequality that currently exists.. In particular, 
the dissertation focuses on the inequality in wealth that is a reality in the country at the 
moment, with the Gini coefficient currently reported to be 0.9. The focus on wealth inequality is 
important because one of the major arguments for the wealth tax in South Africa is that it holds 
the potential to bridge the country’s wealth gap.. Ideally, the annual wealth tax would serve as 
an instrument to redistribute wealth in South Africa and to aid the inequality crisis faced by 
many South Africans. 
Thereafter, the dissertation reviewed actual, proposed or abolished wealth taxes in France, 
Germany and India. The main aim of this part of the dissertation was to look at lessons that 
have been experienced by other countries with regards to the wealth tax. The three countries 
that were looked at are all at different stages of the wealth tax implementation process and 
each country has had challenges or benefits that have been associated with implementing a 
form of annual wealth tax. 
France still has an annual wealth tax (called the Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortun, ISF. The 
implementation of this tax has not come without challenges, the main one being the fact that 
France has lost some of its wealthy citizens with the reason being attributed to the wealth tax. 
This is a particularly concerning challenge because South Africa has been facing economic 
difficulties and losing its wealthy taxpayers would leave it in a more dire situation. The 
dissertation found that the only way that the wealth tax would be successful in comparison to 
the wealth taxes that have already been in place in South Africa, is if the tax was imposed at a 
higher rate. This would have the effect of discouraging South African taxpayers and 
encouraging them to emigrate, just as most French billionaires migrated to Switzerland. 
 
Germany, like South Africa, is still debating the implementation of an annual wealth tax and 
such a tax on the rich has been endorsed by the left wing parties in Germany. This is due to 
the fact that there has been an increase in the need for revenue to cover government spending 
in the country. However, the existing wealth taxes have not been able to raise significant 
revenue in South Africa and the same is anticipated for the annual wealth tax. 
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India abolished its annual wealth tax. India has economic circumstances that are akin to South 
Africa and is the only BRICS country that has implemented an annual wealth tax. There is 
much to be said about the fact that the annual wealth tax was not successful in India and it 
would probably be quite ambitious for South Africa to attempt to impose this tax. The reasons 
behind the abolishment of the wealth tax in India are the following: 
1. ” Firstly, there were certain inequities that were created by the problem of valuation of 
assets as there were some assets that were exempt from taxation”. 
2. “Secondly, tax authorities did not account for the indexation of wealth taxation with 
respect to inflation”. 
3. “Thirdly, the tax burden of the collective incidence of the net wealth tax, income and 
other forms of taxes (such as property tax) imposed a heavy burden on the 
taxpayers”(DTC,2018). 
The above issues are similar to those that are anticipated to be encountered by South Africa 
and by this logic it would not make sense for the country to impose the wealth tax. 
Thirdly, the dissertation assessed whether the implementation of an annual wealth tax would 
be aligned to the principles of a good tax system. Particularly it assessed the annual wealth tax 
against the canons of efficiency, simplicity and equity. It placed a greater focus on the canon of 
equity and investigated horizontal and vertical equity and concluded that the wealth tax would 
in fact be unfair. 
When looking at the canon of simplicity the annual wealth tax proved to not be feasible for two 
main reasons. The first being that the valuation of the assets would be a costly and the second 
that the tax is a comprehensive tax and would be expensive to administer.  
In terms of efficiency, the wealthy taxpayers (for who the tax is intended) have access to 
resources that enable them to disinvest from the country or even migrate. This would mean 
that the tax burden would shift to the middle class, who do not have the ability to bear the 
burden of this tax. The wealth tax would, therefore, not be efficient in South Africa.  
Lastly, the canon of equity hinges on horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity, in 
particular, is important because it maintains the fairness of the tax. It maintains the fairness 
based on two main principles, being the ‘ability to pay’ and the ‘benefit’ principles. The ‘ability 
to pay’ principle requires that taxpayers are not only able to pay the tax but are able to bear the 
burden of the tax. Based on this, the wealth tax does not align with the ideals of horizontal 
equity on all counts. The tax is an unfair tax as it undermines the fact that taxpayers who do 
not have the ability to bear the tax burden will be the ones who are ultimately responsible for 
paying the tax. Furthermore, it discourages the taxpayers’ morale to continue paying tax where 
there is no tangible benefit that can be observed. 
Fourthly, the dissertation set out the advantages and disadvantages of implementing an 
annual wealth tax and, from this, concluded that there were more disadvantages than 
advantages to this tax. Some of the disadvantages that held the most weight were: 
 
1. There are practical difficulties associated with the administration of this tax. 
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2. The wealth tax is a cumbersome and comprehensive tax and would be expensive to 
administer. 
3. It would result in a reduction in the taxpayer’s desire to save. Savings in the bank would 
be an asset in the taxpayer’s hands and would therefore be taxable. This would 
discourage the taxpayers from saving their money as it would be subject to tax. 
 
Lastly, this dissertation looked donations tax, transfer duty and estate duty, which are the 
existing wealth taxes in the country. Securities Transfer Tax is also a wealth tax in South 
Africa, however, the chapter did not analyse it. The chapter assessed what the intended ideals 
are behind these taxes and looked at whether these taxes are able to accomplish them by 
contributing to the South African revenue and reducing the inequality in wealth that currently 
exsits.  
Donations tax and estate duty have been performing poorly in terms of tax revenue collections 
and it is estimated that they have contributed 1.2% in total to the tax revenue. Furthermore, 
estate duty yielded a negative percentage growth in the 2018/19 tax year. Transfer duty seems 
to be the only wealth tax that has seen steady increases in the percentage contribution to the 
South African tax revenue from 2015 to date. 
This dissertation therefore concludes that an annual wealth tax would not currently be feasible 
for South Africa. The process of introducing an annual wealth tax would be a costly exercise 
and there is no guarantee that it will yield substantial tax revenue. The existing wealth taxes, 
although underperforming, are sufficient for South Africa. Economic factors have to be 
considered when assessing their performance as well, because the results that these taxes 
yield are affected by market performance. An example is the stagnation in the property market 
which will influence the performance of transfer duty. Furthermore, there is great potential for 
the existing wealth taxes to be improved on and this has already happened via the introduction 
of section 7C and increasing the tax duty for estate duty. A better alternative would be to look 
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